



# Applying Systems Thinking to Public Policy Regulating in the Power Industry

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ReliabilityFirst

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*INCOSE Cleveland NE-Ohio Chapter Meeting*

# Abstract

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Reliability*First* is a non-for-profit organization that has been given authority in the Northeastern US to enforce the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) CFR Title 10 Energy Regulations for Ensuring Power Grid reliability as defined by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC.) Reliability*First* has decided strategically to apply Systems Engineering principles to optimize their regulation of the Power Industry. This presentation will first discuss the complex sub-system of Power Grid Reliability and the surrounding complex system that regulates the Power Grid Reliability Sub-system (i.e. Systems of Systems Approach.) Then the modeling and optimizing of this regulatory scheme will be outlined, describing the interaction between Engineers, Attorneys, and Industry Leaders in the development and deployment of these processes. Comparisons will be drawn between the regulatory scheme and the INCOSE process areas.

# Outline

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
- ✓ Overview of Reliability*First*
- ✓ Regulatory Complex System
  - Grid Reliability Complex Subsystem
    - Power Grid Subsystem (Power Flow Modeling)
    - Risk Harm Measurement
    - Design Structure Matrix (N-Squared Diagrams)
    - Cascade/Chaos Analysis
  - Entity Behavioral Complex Subsystem
  - Reliability*First* Complex Subsystem
- ✓ System Engineering Process Areas and the Regulatory Scheme
- ✓ Roadmap

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# Overview of ReliabilityFirst

# Historical Blackouts

## Slipping Into Darkness | Some of the biggest power outages since 1965



# Size of the Power Grid



## NATIONAL


US Power Market \$250B  
940 Million Pounds of Coal Per Day  
830GW of Power Flow per Day  
(14KWhr / person / day)

## RELIABILITY FIRST REGION

188GW Peak Load  
66,067 Miles of Transmission Line  
1600+ Plants



# Transmission (Ring Topology) Distribution (Radial Topology in US)



◇ U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force ◇ August 14th Blackout: Causes and Recommendations ◇

# Reliability *First* Members

## Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) 2/0

Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.  
PJM Interconnection, LLC

### Small LSE 10/2

Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.  
Atlantic City Electric  
Buckeye Power Inc.  
City of Vineland NJ  
Cloverland Electric Cooperative (CEC)  
Delmarva Power  
Illinois Municipal Electric Agency  
Lansing Board of Water and Light  
Michigan Public Power Agency  
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative  
Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc.  
Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc.

### Medium LSE 3/1

Consumers Energy Company  
The Detroit Edison Company  
PEPCO Energy Services, Inc.  
Wisconsin Electric Power Company

### Large LSE 2/0

American Electric Power Service Corp.  
Exelon Corporation

### Supplier 9/12

AES North America Generation  
Calpine Energy Services LP  
CMS Enterprises Company  
CMS Energy Resource Management Company  
Dominion Energy, Inc.  
Dynergy Inc.  
Edison Mission Marketing & Trading, Inc.  
FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.  
Hazleton Generation LLC  
Louis Dreyfus Energy Services L.P.  
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.  
NextEra Energy Resources, LLC  
Ohio Power Co.  
PPL Brunner Island, LLC  
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC  
PPL Holtwood, LLC  
PPL Lower Mount Bethel Energy, LLC  
PPL Martins Creek, LLC  
PPL Montour, LLC  
PPL Susquehanna, LLC  
Tenaska, Inc.

### Transmission Company 17/4

American Transmission Co., LLC  
Appalachian Power Co.  
The Dayton Power and Light Co.  
Duke Energy Shared Services, Inc.  
Duquesne Light Company  
FirstEnergy Services Company  
Hootler Energy Rural Electric Cooperative Inc.  
Indianapolis Power & Light Company  
International Transmission Company  
Linden VFT LLC  
Michigan Electric Transmission Company, LLC  
Neptune Regional Transmission System, LLC  
Northern Indiana Public Service Company  
Ohio Valley Electric Corporation  
Potomac Electric Power Company  
PPL Electric Utilities Corporation  
Public Service Enterprise Group Inc.  
Rookland Electric Company  
Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company  
Veotren Energy Delivery of Indiana, Inc.  
Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.

### Adjunct Members


AEP Energy Partners, Inc.  
Illinois Citizens Utility Board  
Office of Peoples Counsel District of Columbia  
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate  
Tennessee Valley Authority  
Utility Services, Inc.




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# Regulatory Complex System

# Power Industry Regulation Overview



# Regulatory Complex System



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
# Grid Reliability Complex Subsystem

# Grid Reliability Complex Subsystem

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Power Grid Subsystem	Equipment Failure	Human Error
Cybersecurity	Physical Security	Terrorist Threat
Climate – Earthquake, Hurricanes, Water	GMD / EMP	Resiliency
Dynamic Stability	Generation / Load Balancing	Reserve Capacity

# Methods of Engineering Complex Systems



# Resiliency – Human Error




Figure P.3 The frequency of various outcomes


Source: Hollnagel 2008

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# Power Grid Subsystem (Power Flow Modeling)



# Simple Power Grid in Powerworld®



Generator Information for Current Case

Bus Number: 1  
 Bus Name: Generator Bus  
 ID: 1  
 Area Name: Home (1)  
 Generator MVA Base: 100.00  
 Status:  Open  
 Energized:  YES (Online)  
 Fuel Type: Unknown  
 Unit Type: UN (Unknown)

Power and Voltage Control

Power Control  
 MW Output: 500.154  
 Min. MW Output: 0.000  
 Max. MW Output: 1000.000  
 Available for AGC:   
 Enforce MW Limits:   
 Participation Factor: 0.00  
 Loss Sensitivity: 0.0000

Voltage Control  
 Mvar Output: 164.010  
 Min Mvar: -1000.000  
 Max Mvar: 1000.000  
 Regulated Bus Number: 1  
 Desired Reg. Bus Voltage: 1.0000  
 Actual Reg. Bus Voltage: 1.0000  
 Use Capability Curve:   
 Wind Control Mode: None  
 Power Factor: 1.0000  
 Remote Reg %: 100.0

Branch Information Dialog

Transformer

From Bus: 2  
 To Bus: 1  
 Circuit: 1  
 Name: Load Bus  
 Area: Home (1)  
 Nominal kv: 345.0  
 Voltage/Angle: 0.99091 -6.5800 1.00000 0.0000  
 From End Metered:

Parameters

Status:  Open  
 Energized:  YES (Online)  
 Branch Device Type: Transformer  
 Allow Consolidation:   
 Has Line Shunts:

Per Unit Impedance Parameters

Series Resistance (R): 0.00000  
 Series Reactance (X): 0.25000  
 Shunt Charging (B): 0.0000  
 Shunt Conductance (G): 0.0000  
 Magnetizing Conductance: 0.000000  
 Magnetizing Susceptance: 0.000000

MVA Limits

Limit A: 1200.000  
 Limit B: 0.000  
 Limit C: 0.000  
 Limit D: 0.000  
 Limit E: 0.000  
 Limit F: 0.000  
 Limit G: 0.000  
 Limit H: 0.000

Line Flow at From Bus

Load Bus (2)  
 Sign Convention: From --> To  
 -216.28 MW  
 -93.78 Mvar  
 % MVA: 19.64  
 % Amps: 19.83

Generator Bus (1)  
 Sign Convention: To --> From  
 216.28 MW  
 124.98 Mvar  
 249.80 MVA  
 418.03 Amps  
 20.82 % MVA  
 20.82 % Amps

Line Losses

0.000 MW  
 31.199 Mvar

Branch Information Dialog

Line

From Bus: 1  
 To Bus: 2  
 Circuit: 2  
 Name: Generator Bus  
 Area: Home (1)  
 Nominal kv: 345.0  
 Voltage/Angle: 1.00000 0.0000 0.99091 -6.5800  
 From End Metered:

Parameters

Status:  Open  
 Energized:  YES (Online)  
 Branch Device Type: Line  
 Allow Consolidation:   
 Has Line Shunts:

Per Unit Impedance Parameters

Series Resistance (R): 0.00000  
 Series Reactance (X): 0.20000  
 Shunt Charging (B): 0.0000  
 Shunt Conductance (G): 0.0000

MVA Limits

Limit A: 1000.000  
 Limit B: 0.000  
 Limit C: 0.000  
 Limit D: 0.000  
 Limit E: 0.000  
 Limit F: 0.000  
 Limit G: 0.000  
 Limit H: 0.000

Line Flow at From Bus

Generator Bus (1)  
 Sign Convention: From --> To  
 283.87 MW  
 39.03 Mvar  
 286.54 MVA  
 479.52 Amps  
 28.65 % MVA  
 28.65 % Amps

Load Bus (2)  
 Sign Convention: To --> From  
 -283.87 MW  
 -6.19 Mvar  
 283.94 MVA  
 479.52 Amps  
 28.39 % MVA  
 28.65 % Amps

Line Losses


0.000 MW  
 32.843 Mvar

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
# Risk Harm Measurement

# Decision Making Components

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# Decision Making Timeline




# Basic Steps of Decision Making with Experts

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
Calibrate the Expert

- Develop the Cognitive Skill of Estimation
- Consider their Expertise in Field during Questioning
- Update Skill Yearly (requires practice to maintain)



Elicit Estimates

- Remove Ambiguity
- Believe the Data



Make Decision

- Decide based upon information
- Document decision

# EPA Draft White Paper - 2009

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- ✓ “Expert elicitation (EE) is a systematic process of formalizing and quantifying, typically in probabilistic terms, expert judgments about uncertain quantities.”
  
- ✓ “If performed using appropriate methods and quality standards, including peer review and transparency, EE can be a reliable component of sound science.”
  
- ✓ “Expert elicitation has been used by federal agencies, the private sector, academia, and other groups.”
  - EPA’s Office of Air Quality, Planning and Standards (OAQPS) exposure-response lead and ozone.
  - AQPS relationship between exposures to fine particles and the annual incidence of mortality.
  - DOE nuclear waste and other related issues.
  - Other uses by government and academia include cost-benefit analysis, risks associated with climate change, technology development, and food safety.

# Risk-Harm Overview

## OCCURRENCE 90% CONFIDENCE RANGE

High	1	> 1 in 1
High	2	1 in 3
Serious	3	1 in 8
Serious	4	1 in 20
Unlikely	5	1 in 80
Unlikely	6	1 in 400
Unlikely	7	1 in 1,000
Minimal	8	1 in 15,000
Minimal	9	1 in 150,000
Not Likely	10	< 1 in 1,500,000

## DETECTION 90% CONFIDENCE RANGE


Almost Impossible	1	> 1 in 2	50.0%
Very Remote	2	1 in 5	80.0%
Remote	3	1 in 6	82.0%
Very Low	4	1 in 7	85.0%
Low	5	1 in 8	87.5%
Moderate	6	1 in 10	90.0%
Moderately High	7	1 in 13	92.5%
High	8	1 in 20	95.0%
Very High	9	1 in 40	97.5%
Almost Certain	10	< 1 in 200	99.5%

## POTENTIAL HARM 90% CONFIDENCE RANGE

Name	Rank	Loss of Equipment	Loss of Generation/Load	Loss of Visibility	System Restoration
Extreme	1	Loss of more than three (3) pieces of BES equipment of > 200 kV, Loss of more than three substations ≤ 200 kV	Unintended loss of load and/or generation > 10,000 MWs	EMS, ICCP, SCADA - 100% Data Affected -or- Loss of visibility of multiple Utilities* (or TOs) transmission and generating substations	System Restoration Time greater than 24 hrs following an event
Substantial	2	Loss of up to three (3) pieces of BES equipment > 200 kV, Loss of up to three (3) substations ≤ 200 kV	Unintended loss of load and/or generation from 5,000-to-10,000 MWs	EMS, ICCP, SCADA - 75% Data Affected -or- Loss of visibility of a single utility's (or TO) transmission and generating substations	System Restoration Time from 18- 24 hrs following an event
Intermediate	3	Loss of a single piece of BES equipment > 200 kV, loss of up to three (3) pieces of BES equipment ≤ 200 kV	Unintended loss of load and/or generation from 999-to- 4,999 MWs	EMS, ICCP, SCADA - 50% Data Affected -or- loss of visibility of multiple transmission or generating substations (or RTUs)	System Restoration Time from 12 - 16 hrs following an event
Minor	4	Loss of a single piece of BES equipment ≤ 200 kV	Unintended loss of load and/or generation from 300-to-999 MWs	EMS, ICCP, SCADA - 50% Data Affected -or- loss of visibility of one transmission or generating substation (or RTU)	System Restoration Time from 6 - 12 hrs following an event
None	5	No loss of any BES equipment	Unintended loss of load and/or generation < 300 MWs	EMS, ICCP, SCADA - less than 25% Data Affected	No impact on system recovery following an event

**FINAL RISK HARM  
SCALE OF 1 to 12**

# Rationalities / Biases





# The Field

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“Out beyond ideas of wrong-doing and right-doing,  
there is a field.  
I'll meet you there.

When the soul lies down in that grass,  
the world is too full to talk about.

Ideas, language, even the phrase each other  
doesn't make any sense.”

Rumi - 1207-1273

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# Design Structure Matrix (N-Squared Diagrams)

# ASSET DSM

Can a failure of the asset in this column cause a forced or unforced outage of an asset in this row?	Generation (including GSU, Xrfm, I/C)	Substation Transformers	Relays	Transmission	Substations	Circuit Breakers	Capacitors	Reactors	Protection System (including SPS)	Automatic UFLS	Automatic UVLS	Blackstart resources	Phase Shifter	CCA, ESP, PSP
Generation resources (including GSU, Xrfm, Int)	●	○	●	●	●	○	○		○	○	○			●
Substation Transformers	○	●	●	●	●	○	●			○	○	○		●
Relays	●	●	●	○	○	○	○		●			●		●
Transmission	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	○	○		○	●
Substations	○	○	●	○	●	●			○	○	○			●
Circuit Breakers	○	●	●	●	●	●	○		○			○		●
Capacitors	○	○		●	●	●	●			○	○			●
Reactors	○	○		●	●	●		●		○	○			●
Protection System (including SPS)	○	○	●	●	●	○		○	●			○		●
Automatic UFLS			●							●				●
Automatic UVLS			●								●			●
Blackstart resources		○	●	●	●	○	○		○	○		●		●
Phase Shifter	○			●	●	●	○						●	●
CCA, ESP, PSP														●

## PROMPT QUESTION:

To fill in this DSM, as yourself “Can a failure of the asset listed at the top of the column cause a forced or unforced outage of the assets listed in the rows below it?”

Fill in a 1 for rarely, 3 for sometimes, and 5 for almost always

# STANDARDS DSM

INPUT → OUTPUT ^	BAL-001	BAL-002	BAL-003	BAL-004	BAL-005	BAL-006	BAL-502	CIP-001	CIP-002	CIP-003	CIP-004	CIP-005	CIP-006	CIP-007	CIP-008	CIP-009	COM-001	COM-002
BAL-001	■																	
BAL-002		■																
BAL-003			■															
BAL-004				■														
BAL-005					■													
BAL-006						■												
BAL-502							■											
CIP-001								■										
CIP-002									■									
CIP-003										■	•	•	•	•	•	•		
CIP-004											■							
CIP-005									•	•	•	■	•	•	•	•		
CIP-006										•	•	•	■		•	•		
CIP-007										•	•	•		■				
CIP-008														•	■			
CIP-009																■		
COM-001																	■	
COM-002																		■

## PROMPT QUESTION:

To fill in this DSM, as yourself “Does the standard listed at the top of the column receive inputs from any of the standards in the rows listed below it?”

Fill in a 1 for yes 0 for no

# Our DSMs and DMMs Today

- ✓ We decided at this point, to fill out the following elements of our Periodic Table:

	STANDARD	CONTROL AREA	ENTITY	VIOLATION	INTERNAL CONTROL	ASSET	MTBF	MTRR	COSTS
STANDARD	STANDARDS DSM			VIOLATION X STANDARDS DMM					
CONTROL AREA			UNDER CONSTRUCTION				MTBF X CONTROL AREA DMM		
ENTITY									
VIOLATION									
INTERNAL CONTROL									
ASSET	STANDARDS X ASSET DMM	CONTROL AREA X ASSET DMM				ASSET DSM	MTBF X ASSET DMM		
MTBF									
MTRR									
COSTS									



# Combining Elements on the Periodic Table

- ✓ Like chemists combining elements to form new molecules, we combine DSMs and DMMs to answer specific questions:

How does asset life estimates from warranty data roll up to estimate overall regional reliability and by control area?					
MTBF X ASSET DMM	MTBF X CONTROL AREA DMM				
Which standards have the most impact on regional grid reliability using these high level DSM's and DMM's?					
VIOLATION X STANDARDS DMM	STANDARDS DSM	STANDARDS X ASSET DMM	ASSET DSM	MTBF X ASSET DMM	

# Cascade/Chaos Analysis (Ian Dobson)

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# Entity Behavioral Complex Subsystem




# Approach to Entity Behavior

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“...If those responsible for controlling risks lack the analytic fabric to disaggregate the overall problem into actionable projects, then they cannot work on them intelligently; nobody will know what to do tomorrow – except to do the same things they did yesterday.”

Sparrow – The Regulatory Craft



# Modeling


How does the INPUT in each row effect the OUTPUT in each column impact to Grid Reliability	+5 Strong Positive Effect +3 Positive Effect +1 Weak Positive Effect 0 No Effect -1 Weak Negative Effect -3 Negative Effect -5 Strong Negative Effect																																
	Fostering a Self-Reporting Culture	Having Just enough Compliance to Standards	Being open and sharing their Compliance to Standards with their	Being open and sharing their Compliance to Standards with other	Taking proactive stances on compliance, not reactive stances	Not having a false or "half" compliance program on paper only	Having an Internal compliance committee like "the rock" at PJM	Having "Compliance Blitz" meetings	Organizing evidence of compliance very well	Spending time on Audit Prep	Spending time between audits, not waiting until audit	Having an appropriate size Compliance Staff	Having appropriate staff experience in their Compliance Staff	Having an appropriate number of Compliance SREs	Having a Self-Assessing Culture (e.g. Root cause analysis)	Showing Good Participation on standards drafting teams and con	Sharing between other entities or industry	Having sincere "reliability at heart" interactions w/RFC	Having good voting history on standards	Not having "Musical chairs" for those who were good at driving R	Having a good Whistleblower program for reliability issues	Having Leadership with strong message about reliability	Willingness to say what they recommend to others	Having fewer Violations	Not showing Undisciplined Behavior and High human error	Having and appropriate Reliability Risk Tolerances	Having good Situational Awareness about Reliability	Taking the shortest possible time to Detect a Violation	Having a Passion for Reliability on their Performance Evaluations	Having Strong Internal Controls			
Reliability First's Response Time when an Entity has a Request	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-1	-3	-3	-3	-1	3	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Reliability First's Credibility and Confidentiality with our Entities	-3	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-3	0	-1	0	-1	-3	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	-3	
Reliability First's Formal Information Requests of Entities	1	1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	-3	-3	-3	-3	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Reliability First's Informal Information Requests of Entities	0	3	-1	-1	0	0	1	-1	-1	0	0	3	3	3	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Reliability First's Interactions with Members in our Region	3	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	
Reliability First's Board of Directors interaction with ReliabilityFirst Staff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Reliability First's Seminars and Workshops we Host	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	0	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	3	0	1	-1	0	0	-1	0	-1	0	-1	-1	-1	3	-1	0	0	-1	
Reliability First's Committee Participation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Reliability First's Trade Groups and Forums Participation	-1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	-1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	
Reliability First's Professional Organizations we Belong to	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	
Reliability First's Communication Devices (like surveys)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Reliability First's Entity Data Collection	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Reliability First's Monthly Newsletter Document	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	-1	0	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	
Reliability First's Employees Skills and Background	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	5	0	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	-1	0	0	3		
Reliability First's Employees Personal Professional Relationships with Indust	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	-1		
Reliability First's Consistency of Message Amongst Ourselves (without comm	-1	0	1	1	-1	-1	-3	0	3	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	-1	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	-1		
Compliance's Self Certification	-1	0	0	0	-1	-1	0	-1	3	3	3	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Compliance's Audits	-1	-1	0	0	-1	1	-1	-1	3	5	0	5	3	3	3	3	1	0	3	0	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	0	0	1	1	-1		
Compliance's Spot Checks	-1	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	3	3	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Compliance's Assiat Visits	0	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	-1	0	0	-1	0	0	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Compliance's Monthly Compliance Monitoring Schedule Document	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Compliance's Lessons Learned Documents	-1	0	-1	-1	-1	0	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	0	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



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# ReliabilityFirst Complex Subsystem

# Organization



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# System Engineering Process Areas and the Regulatory Scheme

# NERC Standards

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## CYBERSECURITY/SECURITY

- CIP - Critical Infrastructure Protection (Security and Cybersecurity)


## OPERATIONS/PLANNING

- BAL - Resource and Demand Balancing
- COM – Communications (Operators...)
- EOP - Emergency Preparedness and Operations
- FAC - Facilities Design, Connections, and Maintenance
- INT - Power Interchange Scheduling and Coordination
- IRO - Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination
- MOD - Modeling, Data, and Analysis
- NUC - Nuclear
- PER - Personnel Performance, Training, and Qualifications
- PRC - Protection and Control
- TOP - Transmission Operations
- TPL - Transmission Planning
- VAR - Voltage and Reactive

# INCOSE Process Areas and NERC Standards

INCOSE process areas:	NERC Reliability Standards:								
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT	5	CIP-002	EOP-009	IRO-010	MOD-016	PRC-008			
ASSESSMENT									
CONTROL									
PLANNING	14	BAL-002-WECC EOP-007	BAL-502-RFC IRO-004	BAL-STD TOP-002	CIP-008 TOP-003	CIP-009 TPL-001	EOP-001 TPL-005	EOP-003 TPL-006	
QUALITY MANAGEMENT									
STAKEHOLDER REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION	4	FAC-001	FAC-002	FAC-008	FAC-009				
SUPPLY									
DECISION MAKING									
SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE PROCESS MANAGEMENT									
INTEGRATION									
RISK MANAGEMENT									
IMPLEMENTATION									
VALIDATION	4	PRC-007	PRC-009	PRC-010	PRC-014				
VERIFICATION	16	MOD-001 MOD-017 MOD-029	MOD-004 MOD-018 MOD-030	MOD-008 MOD-019	MOD-010 MOD-021	MOD-012 MOD-024	MOD-014 MOD-025	MOD-015 MOD-028	
REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS									
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT	11	IRO-002 PRC-013	IRO-015 PRC-015	IRO-016 PRC-020	MOD-011 PRC-021	MOD-013 TOP-005	MOD-020	PRC-012	
ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN									
TRANSITION									
OPERATION	54	BAL-001 COM-001 EOP-005 INT-001 INT-009 IRO-014 PRC-016 TOP-008	BAL-002 COM-002 EOP-006 INT-003 INT-010 NUC-001-2 PRC-018 TPL-002	BAL-003 CIP-001 EOP-008 INT-004 IRO-003 PRC-001 PRC-022 TPL-003	BAL-004 CIP-003 FAC-010 INT-005 IRO-005 PRC-002 PRC-023 TPL-004	BAL-004-WECC CIP-005 FAC-011 INT-006 IRO-006 PRC-002-NPCC TOP-004 VAR-001	BAL-005 CIP-006 FAC-012 INT-007 IRO-008 PRC-003 TOP-006 VAR-002	BAL-006 EOP-004 FAC-014 INT-008 IRO-009 PRC-006 TOP-007 VAR-002-WECC	
MAINTENANCE	8	CIP-007	FAC-003	FAC-501-WECC	PRC-004	PRC-005	PRC-011	PRC-017	
DISPOSAL									
ENTERPRISE ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT									
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT									
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT	9	CIP-004 PER-005	EOP-002 TOP-001	IRO-001	PER-001	PER-002	PER-003	PER-004	
ACQUISITION									

# Systems Engineering at Reliability *First*





# Reliability Assessment and Performance Analysis Group

Area of Work	Activity(ies)	Proficiencies Gained
<b>Resource Adequacy</b>	Collection and analysis of demand (i.e. electrical load) and capacity (i.e. generation) forecasts and determination of resource adequacy.	Knowledge of demand and capacity data composition, probability techniques and methods (such as Loss of Load Probability and Loss of Load Expectation) used to determine adequacy <i>Reliability Engineering – Statistical Analysis</i>
<b>Transmission System Modeling</b>	Collection and assembly of power flow (e.g. nodes and branches) and dynamic (e.g. generator governor) data to build transmission system models of the Eastern Interconnection.	Knowledge of the detailed data and solution of complex transmission system models Developing system models solution techniques Familiarity with modeling software (e.g. PSS/e) <i>Systems Engineering – Verification and Validation</i>
<b>Transmission System Studies</b>	Performing power flow analysis, including transfer capability, voltage analysis, generation redispatch, contingency analysis, etc.	Knowledge of how to conduct complex transmission system analyses Developing contingency lists and writing technical reports Familiarity with power flow software (e.g. PSS/e MUST TARA) <i>Systems Engineering – Verification and Validation</i>
<b>Protection of transmission and generation equipment</b>	Reviewing generator outage data and transmission branch outage data and correlation with reported misoperation data.	Basic knowledge of transmission and generation protection schemes Corrective action for misoperations Basic knowledge of generation and transmission outage data and statistics <i>Systems Engineering – Architectural Design</i> <i>Reliability Engineering – Probability and Statistical Analysis</i>
<b>Disturbance Reporting and Event Analysis</b>	Reviewing reported disturbances, sequence of events, determining root causes, development of lessons learned.	Levels of events and reporting thresholds Reporting procedures for disturbances and events <i>Reliability Engineering – Root Cause Determination</i> <i>Systems Engineering – Decision Making</i>

# Compliance Services and Investigations Group

Area of Work	Activity(ies)	Proficiencies Gained
Compliance Services	Monitor and track entity performance, develop trends and metrics, etc.	Knowledge of the Compliance Monitoring Methods and the recognition of meaningful correlations <i>Reliability Engineering – Statistical Analysis</i>
Investigations	Participate in investigations.	Knowledge of the investigation process including identifying and interpreting the discrete features of deteriorated system causing the loss of an intended function <i>Reliability Engineering – Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) and Root Cause Analysis</i>
Certifications	Perform functional entity Certifications for Reliability Coordinators, Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators.	Knowledge of the Functional Model describing the roles each entity plays in assuring reliability and stability of the electrical grid <i>Systems Engineering – Verification and Validation</i>
Registration of Entities	Analyze entity circuit configurations and apply Registration Criteria to determine their proper designation within the Functional Model.	Application of abstract models to actual system configurations. <i>Systems Engineering – Stakeholder Requirements Definition</i>
System Events	Review and perform a compliance analysis of system events.	Perform a post-mortem of system events, including a compliance evaluation <i>Reliability Engineering – FRACAS and Root Cause Analysis</i>
Complaints	Assess the validity of the facts associated with Complaints and determine any compliance impact.	Techniques for assessing items reported by entities to make compliance determinations <i>Systems Engineering – Validation</i>
Compliance Determinations	Gather and analyze entity data submittals as per the Annual Implementation Plan.	Analysis of all data submitted by the entities to make compliance determinations <i>Reliability Engineering – Statistical Analysis</i>
Annual Reporting	Develop and report regional data.	Knowledge of all reporting requirements to NERC and FERC <i>Systems Engineering – Stakeholder Requirements Definition</i>
Portal - Software Maintenance and Upgrading	Review, update, and assist in the development of the regional software application. Assist in the development of software initiatives.	Development of the business rules associated with compliance software <i>Systems Engineering – Architectural Design</i>

# Planning and Operations Audit Group

Area of Work	Activity(ies)	Proficiencies Gained
<b>Planning and Operations Audits/Spot Checks</b>	<p>Participate in the completion of audits and spot checks following NERC and auditing standards and practices including the review of electrical power data and information.</p> <p>Creation of reports on the findings of audits and spot checks.</p>	<p>Knowledge of the BES and the functional interrelationships associated with the operation, planning and maintenance of the BES.</p> <p>Knowledge of the ReliabilityFirst Audit process and execution of key activities to complete the audit/spot-check within the established milestone timelines.</p> <p>Knowledge of Auditing Standards and Practices</p> <p><i>Systems Engineering – Validation</i></p>
<b>Entity Impact Evaluation</b>	<p>Utilize Entity Impact Evaluation (EIE) as part of developing of an Audit Plan for ReliabilityFirst audited entities.</p> <p>Support the development of the EIE process.</p>	<p>An understanding and awareness of the impact registered entities may have on the BES.</p> <p>An understanding of the factors which are important to creation of EIEs.</p> <p><i>Reliability Engineering – Probability and Statistics Tools</i></p> <p><i>Systems Engineering – Risk Management</i></p>
<b>Entity Outreach</b>	<p>Support registered entities through workshops, initiatives, and communications on compliance, audit processes, and other topics to assist the entities.</p>	<p>A thorough understanding of Compliance and Operations &amp; Planning to be able to conduct effective training.</p> <p><i>Systems Engineering – Integration</i></p>

# Critical Information Protection Audit Group

Area of Work	Activity(ies)	Proficiencies Gained
<b>CIP Audits / Spot Checks</b>	<p>Participate in the completion of audits and spot checks following NERC and auditing standards and practices including the review of electrical power data and information.</p> <p>Creation of reports on the findings of audits and spot checks.</p>	<p>Knowledge of the BES and the functional interrelationships associated with the operation, planning and maintenance of the BES.</p> <p>Knowledge of the ReliabilityFirst Audit process and execution of key activities to complete the audit/spot-check within the established milestone timelines.</p> <p>Knowledge of Auditing Standards and Practices</p> <p><i>Systems Engineering – Validation</i></p>
<b>Technical Feasibility Exception (TFE) Management</b>	Participate in TFE Processing to include reviews and auditing of Approved and Terminated TFEs as part of CIP Audits.	<p>Knowledge of what a TFE encompasses; and how TFEs are tracked, processed, and managed within the applicable CIP standards</p> <p><i>Systems Engineering – Information Management</i></p>
<b>Mitigation Plan Acceptance and Validation Reviews (MPARs and MPVRs)</b>	For CIP related violations, perform acceptance of mitigation plans and verification of evidence for plans to mitigate risk to the Bulk Electric Systems.	<p>Knowledge of industry approaches to mitigate violations in an effort to ensure reliability of the BES.</p> <p>Evaluate Root Cause Analysis efforts for validity</p> <p><i>Reliability Engineering – FRACAS and Root Cause Analysis</i></p> <p><i>Systems Engineering – Validation</i></p>
<b>Risk Based Assessment</b>	Engage in the Risk Based Assessment Committee process and evaluation of ReliabilityFirst audited entities.	<p>Knowledge about the potential risk to the reliability of the BES that each unique ReliabilityFirst registered entity may pose, based on their entity risk profile assessment</p> <p><i>Reliability Engineering – Probability and Statistics Tools</i></p> <p><i>Systems Engineering – Risk Management</i></p> <p><i>An understanding of the outreach efforts to</i></p>
<b>CIP Outreach</b>	<p>Obtain and provide CIP Subject Matter Expertise and support, as required and able for the following activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assist Visits</li> <li>• ERO Workshops</li> <li>• ReliabilityFirst Compliance Workshops</li> <li>• Registered entity inquiries</li> <li>• Compliance Training Needs</li> </ul>	<p>RFC registered entities as well as Regional Entities, NERC and the Industry</p> <p><i>Systems Engineering – Information Management</i></p>

# Analytics and Enforcement Group

Area of Work	Activity(ies)	Proficiencies Gained
Facilitate Events using Brainstorming, C&E, Pareto Analysis	Facilitate events in the Analytics and Enforcement group requiring the collaboration of a group of people with the goal of solving a critical problem.	Gaining consensus for complex system problem sets. <i>Systems Engineering – Stakeholder Requirements Definition</i>
Perform Gauge R&R Studies	Analyze repetitive sets of data to make sure that the underlying process is statistically significant.	Providing testing, analysis and persuasive writings to support technical positions. <i>Reliability Engineering – Probability and Statistics Tools</i>
Facilitate a Process Mapping Event	Facilitate events in the Analytics and Enforcement group to help a group of individuals to map out and improve a current process.	Efficiency analysis and continuous improvement as core competencies. <i>Reliability Engineering – FRACAS and Root Cause Analysis</i>
Participate and Lead Risk Harm Assessments (FMECA Analysis)	Assess the Risk and Harm to the Bulk Electric System with a group of individuals using classic Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.	Predictive analysis and modeling as a form of a proactive reliability tool. <i>Reliability Engineering – Human Calibration and Estimation</i>
Perform Design of Experiment Projects	Use Design of Experiment methodology to reduce the number of tests required to draw a statistically significant conclusion	Ability to derive controlling elements in design or failure analysis. <i>Reliability Engineering – Design of Experiments</i>
Perform Validation of Mitigation Plans	Perform validation of evidence for plans to mitigate risk to the Bulk Electric Systems.	How to evaluate Root Cause Analysis efforts for validity <i>Reliability Engineering – FRACAS and Root Cause Analysis</i> <i>Systems Engineering – Validation</i>
Create Settlement Agreements	Analyze a set of facts and circumstances resulting in a violation of Reliability Standards and determine appropriate settlement terms.	Ability to reduce technical analysis to a description suitable for inclusion in a legal document. <i>Systems Engineering – Requirements Analysis</i>

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
# Roadmap

# Systems Engineering and Risk Analysis

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
“...The field of risk analysis will lose some of its current mystique, gain wider recognition, and more closely merge with the fields of systems engineering, systems analysis, and operations research...government officials, other professionals, and the public at large will have more appreciation of, and confidence in, the process of risk assessment and management...”

Yacov Haimes – *Systems Engineering and Management Series: Risk Modeling, Assessment, and Management* - 2009



RELIABILITY **FIRST**

# Roadmap





# Discussion

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- ✓ **Is there a growing need for applying Systems Engineering and the INCOSE Model in the field of Public Policy, Law, and Regulation? If yes, how would legal professionals participate?**
- ✓ **How do the fields of Systems Engineering and Risk Management intersect?**
- ✓ **What topics covered here would be of interest in upcoming INCOSE conferences/journals or other conferences/journals?**