A Systems Engineering Process to Aid in Preventing Mission Failures

Test Like You Fly (TLYF) Process

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Test Like You "Fight"

Introduction of Naval Artillery – Early 15th - 16th Century



Painting by Louis-Philippe Crepin, in the public domain



First cannons on ships fired forward and aft. Invention of the porthole allowed positioning to broadside.

The first unit permanently equipped with canons was the Nao Galicia, in 1400. Broadside cannons came much later in the century.

Addition of new technologies created the need to test complex actions and interactions PRIOR to use

Lessons from Historical Satellite Failure Data

Many of the Early Post-Insertion Losses are TLYF Escapes

Dead Satellites



Many of the Losses Shortly After Start of Phase Are TLYF Escapes

The Test Like You Fly Process Is Mission Driven

What You Do and How You Do it Matters for Operational Based Tests



First Day Space System Failures

May Involve Many Elements

- Failure to become power positive
- Failure to become attitude stable
- Failure to communicate with command & control
- Vehicle acquired in off nominal conditions



Notional Functional Flow Diagram for Auto Initialization



Lessons from Historical Launch Failure Data

This Is Rocket Science and It's Not Very Forgiving

Product Line	Flight #1	Flight #2	Flight #3	Flight #4	Flight #n
LV A 1	Fail	Fail	Fail	Success	End of the line
LV A 2*	Partial Success	Success	Success	Partial Fail	Success
LV B 1	Success	Fail	Success	Success	#5 Fail
LV B 2	Fail	Fail	Success	Success	#7 Fail
LV C	Fail	Fail	Partial Fail	Shutdown	
LV D 1	Fail	Success	Success	Success	
LV D 2	Success	Fail	Success	Shutdown	
LV E	Fail	Shutdown			
LV F*	Success	Success	Success	Success	#9 fail

*Developed with a TLYF process

Many of the early product line losses could be TLYF escapes

Failing to Test Like You Fly Along the System Integration Pyramid Mission-Critical Anomaly & **Integration Level** Vehicle **Root Cause** of Flaw Detectability Titan CT-2 Integrated LV & SV Failure to separate SV. Miswire/numbering error for single Enterprise payload Ariane V **System** Primary and secondary processor Integrated Flight SW & shutdown due to velocity overflow. **Control Subsystem** Element Inertial Reference System disabled. **Subsystem** "Dead code" inherited from Ariane IV Unit ESEX **Payload Power** Battery explosion. Part Subsystem Arcjet "Heritage" battery & charging system **Integration Pyramid** not able to sustain unique charging scheme AV-009 Wrong orbit. Valve Assembly Engine fuel inlet valve did not close fully at end of first burn, resulting in overboard fuel leak during coast phase

Flaws can be introduced at any level of integration and it's best to catch them there

Lessons from Titan CT-2 Launch Vehicle

Assess Differences between Current & Previous Missions

- Previous mission <u>different</u> from current mission
 - Differences not accounted for in test program
- Payload separation error due to incorrect electrical wiring
 - Can you count to 2 if there's only 1?
- Lesson: Test What You Fly
 - Heritage doesn't confirm changes & differences
- Lesson: Test How You Fly
 - Test across mode and phase transitions



Courtesy of NAS/

Loss of Mission

Thermal Environment Consideration

Mission Operational Consideration



Primary thermal control is a balance between environmental and equipment heating with cold space

Mission operations is a time driven set of activities and information transfer between a satellite and ground

Photo courtesy of NASA

The Goal of Systems Integration: Mission Operations



Lessons from Mars Polar Lander*

Test What You Fly

- Faulty touch down sensor logic caused vehicle to crash
- An operationally realistic test had been run, a hardware problem was detected and repaired
- Lesson: Test What You Fly
 - A repaired item is a different entity than the pre-repair item
- Lesson: Test How You Fly
 - Test across a range of initial conditions
 - Test across mode and phase transitions

*Report on the Loss of the Mars Polar Lander and Deep Space 2 Missions, JPL Special Review Board, March 22, 2000.



Loss of Mission

Lessons from Mars Climate Orbiter*

Identify LYF Tests for Ground/Space Interactions



- English-metric units mismatch error
 - Ground software was deemed "noncritical"
- Lesson: Anything that touches/interacts with critical flight equipment and processes is itself, by definition, "critical"
- Lesson: Understand the end-to-end flow of interactions and transactions
- Lesson: Understand the potential paths to failures from handoff errors

Loss of Mission!

* Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board Phase I Report, November 10, 1999.

Lessons from the Mars Program

Test Like You Fly

Mars Polar

Lander Dec 1999

Communicate!

Courtesy of NASA/JPL-Caltech

Two Failed Missions



Think ahead



- Project-level decisions should be made with full representation by all project elements with expertise relevant to the decision issue
 - ...future projects must review their operational scenarios and mission timelines for consistency with their Mission Plans and to determine the necessary planning is in place to support their risk management strategies

Recommendations...

- Increase the amount of formal and informal face-to-face communications
- with all team elements, ... especially for those elements that have critical interfaces
- a systematic assessment of all potential
 failure modes
- Utilize established risk management tools such as fault-tree analysis and FMECA

Mars Climate Orbiter

Sept 1999

What could possibly go wrong?

Lesson From Mars Odyssey*

Do a Pre-Mortem During Design Phase

 Mars Odyssey, the next Mars mission to follow the two Mars failures in 1999, pioneered a method of holding the "failure review board" prior to launch

What could possibly go wrong?

- Method puts the focus on identifying flaws that can kill or severely wound the mission
- Use those revelations to focus the test program to validate or exonerate the existence of those flaws
- Lesson: Do the "mission failure" investigation pre-launch

* Beutelschies, "That One's Gotta Work"* IEEE, 2001

Successful Mission!





Lessons from Hubble Space Telescope

Everything You Wanted to Learn about TLYF



Before

After

Test Like You Use

- Lesson: Conduct end-to-end tests of integrated equipment
- Lesson: Critical fault-related risks that cannot be exonerated should be identified and elevated

Communicate!



Courtesy of NASA/Space Telescope Science Institute (STScl)

Think ahead

Lesson: Identify and mitigate risk* "The Project Manager must make a deliberate effort to identify those aspects of the project where there is a risk of error with serious consequences for the mission. Upon recognizing the risks the manager must consider those actions which mitigate that risk."

Initial Severe Degradation to Mission

*The Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Failure Report, NASA, November, 1990

"What we have here is a failure to communicate"



Tests Aimed at Validation of Concepts of Operations

Test Like You (Fly, Operate, Use, Fight)



Systems Engineering Junior Handbook, The International Council on Systems Engineering LA Chapter, 2015, version 1.0

Guiding Principles for Operationally Realistic "Like You Fly" Testing

• First

 The system should never experience expected operations, environments, stresses, or their combinations for the first time during the mission*

Second

- Do not subject the system to potentially damaging situations

•Third

 LYF testing complements but does not replace other forms of perceptive testing (e.g., environmental, stress, performance, and functional testing)

•Fourth

– When unable to test mission-critical fault paths in an operationally realistic manner, manage the critical fault risk

Murphy is alive & well & working overtime on your program!

^{*} D. Shelton, S. Roskie, Applying the Test Like You Fly Principle, 20th Aerospace Testing Seminar, USAF/The Aerospace Corporation, Manhattan Beach, CA, October 2001

Test Like You Fly—The Implementation Process

Definition

- *Test Like You Fly* is a <u>prelaunch/pre-operational</u> systems engineering *process* that translates mission operations concepts into perceptive operationally realistic tests to detect latent mission-critical flaws and assesses the risk of missing those flaws when it is not feasible to do those tests or adequately represent key mission characteristics while executing such a test
 - The TLYF process is a comprehensive approach to validate a system's capability to perform the mission <u>prior</u> to launch or fielding
 - The TLYF process goes beyond the test domain; it also relies heavily on systems engineering disciplines
- "Like You Fly" testing is a method to find flaws in the actual system to ensure its ability to perform the mission <u>post-launch</u>

The TLYF process results in operationally realistic "like you fly" (LYF) tests that address potential mission-critical flaw paths and contributors

TLYF Process Implementation Systems Engineering and Test Development Interaction The TLYF Process will be taught on August 17-18 4 – 6 pm Pacific. **Hosted by INCOSE-LA.** Registration Link: http://events.r20.constantcontact.com/register/event?oeidk=a07eh6kmtkz6b523 17e&llr=l4ihvgeab **Operationally Realistic Mission Fault Informed Risk Management Test Development Characterize the** Architect LYF system and Ε tests mission n S g V i Т **Do mission** s n Map mission to **Design LYF** е critical fault t e LYF tests tests S analysis e e t mr s i **Perform critical** n Execute and

The TLYF Process has both System Engineering and Test aspects

fault risk

management

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* TOR-2014-02537-REV A - The Test Like You Fly Process Guide for Space, Launch, and Ground Systems, Julia D. White 20 and Lindsay G. Tilney, September 30, 2016

evaluate LYF

tests



