
Identification of weak signals to prevent emergent system failures in process industries

Mengxi Yu*, Noor Quddus, Sam M. Mannan

Email Address*: yuxxx433@tamu.edu

Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center
Texas A&M University
College Station, Texas 77843-3122, USA

Outline

- ☞ Motivation
- ☞ Challenges
- ☞ What has been done
- ☞ Objective & Methodology
- ☞ Modeling of complex systems
- ☞ Conclusions
- ☞ References

Motivation

- Existence of Weak Signals
- BP Texas City Explosion and Fire (2005)
 - Delayed maintenance
 - Operator overtime shift
 - Inadequate staffing and supervision
 - Practice of overfilling during start-ups



Challenges to Catch Weak Signals

▣ Nature of Weak Signals

▣ Few studies have been conducted

- to identify weak signals or evaluate effectiveness of weak signal management in organizations

Challenges to Catch Weak Signals

▣ Complex Socio-technical System

- Emergent failures

▣ Traditional Hazard Identification Techniques

- Fault Tree Analysis/Event Tree Analysis
- Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP)
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
- Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)


Efforts that Have Been Done

System-based techniques


- Acci-Map
- System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP)
- Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM)

Objective & Methodology

- Develop a framework to identify weak signals to prevent emergent system failures




Process - PMMA Polymerization



PMMA: Poly(methyl methacrylate)
Initiator: Azobis-isobutyronitril (AIBN)
Monomer: Methyl methacrylate (MMA)
Solution: Toluene


Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM)

- Identify the functions that are involved in a system




Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM)


- Identify how functions interact



Overview of FRAM




Model Interactions-Process Parameters



Function: Exothermic Reaction
– Kinetics and thermodynamics

Model Interactions-Equipment Reliability and Preventive Maintenance (PM)




Function: Maintenance

- Deferred preventive maintenance (PM)
- Imperfect Maintenance Model based on age-reduction

Imperfect Maintenance Model

Model Assumptions

- PM is scheduled based on a predetermined reliability threshold
- PM reduces the effective age of a system, but not affects the deterioration rate



y_i = effective age before the i th PM

ξ_i = age reduction factor due to i th PM [0,1]

Imperfect Maintenance Model Cont.

- ▣ Cumulative probability of failure after (i-1)th PM:

$$F^{(i-1)}(t) = \text{function}(\alpha, \beta, j, \xi_j, y_j, t)$$

$$j=1,2,\dots,(i-1)$$

y_j = effective age before the i th PM

α, β : parameters of deterioration rate distribution

ξ_j = age reduction factor due to j th PM [0,1]

- ▣ Influence of PM on reliability

Model Interactions - Human Function and Human/Organizational Factors

☞ During normal operation

- What is the probability of control room operator to make mistakes?
- What are possible failure modes of operator behavior?

☞ During abnormal situation

- How much time will it take for an operator to provide proper response?

Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Techniques

▮ HRA Techniques

- SLIM-MAUD
- THERP
- JHEDI
- HEART
- SPAR-H
- CREAM
- HCR


▮ Selection Criteria

- Performance Shaping Factor (PSF)
- Flexibility
- PSF Dependency
- Application field

Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM)

CREAM - during normal conditions

Human Action	Cognitive Activity	Cognitive Demands	Failure Scenario	Failure Type	Nominal Probability
Check level indicator after addition	Verify	Interpretation / Observation	(1) Not check	Delayed Interpretation	0.01
			(2) Check but make a wrong decision		Decision Error
			Comply with procedure		0.97



The distribution is adjusted by influencing index of 9 PSFs

Human Cognitive Reliability (HCR) Model

▣ HCR- during abnormal situation

▣ $(T_{0.5})_{\text{modified}}$

$$= (T_{0.5})_{\text{simulation}} (1 + K_1) (1 + K_2) (1 + K_3) \dots (1 + K_i)$$

K_i Coefficient of performance shaping factor i

Conclusions

- ❏ Complexity of socio-technical system and tremendous amount of information stored in plants make it difficult to recognize emergent failures
- ❏ The study is aimed to develop an integrated framework to identify emergent failures in process industries
- ❏ Weak signals of the emergent failures will be further identified
- ❏ Model validation by using real plant data is needed in future work

Collaborations with industries are needed

References

- [1] Hopkins, A. (2008). *Failure to learn : the BP Texas City refinery disaster*. Andrew Hopkins: Sydney, N.S.W. : CCH Australia, 2008.
- [2] Refinery explosion and fire (15 killed, 180 injured) : BP, Texas City, Texas, March 23, 2005 / U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.
- [3] Brizon, A., & Wybo, J. L. (2009). The life cycle of weak signals related to safety. *International Journal of Emergency Management*, 6(2), 117-135.
- [4] Guillaume, E. G. (2011). *Identifying and responding to weak signals to improve learning from experiences in high-risk industry* (Doctoral dissertation, TU Delft, Delft University of Technology).
- [5] Körvers, P. P. (2004). Accident precursors: pro-active identification of safety risks in the chemical process industry.
- [6] Luyk, J. J. (2011). *Towards improving detection of early warning signals within organizations: an approach to the identification and utilization of underlying factors from an organizational perspective* (Doctoral dissertation, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven)
- [7] Cameron, I., Mannan, S., Németh, E., Park, S., Pasman, H., Rogers, W., & Seligmann, B. (2017). Process hazard analysis, hazard identification and scenario definition: Are the conventional tools sufficient, or should and can we do much better? *Process Safety and Environmental Protection*, 110, 53-70. doi:10.1016/j.psep.2017.01.025
- [8] Altabbakh, H., AlKazimi, M. A., Murray, S., & Grantham, K. (2014). STAMP – Holistic system safety approach or just another risk model? *Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries*, 32, 109-119.
- [9] Rodriguez, M., & Diaz, I. (2016). A systematic and integral hazards analysis technique applied to the process industry. *Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries*, 43, 721-729. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2016.06.016

References

- [10] Mannan, S. Lees' Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volumes 1-3 (3rd Edition). In: Elsevier.
- [11] Alvarenga, M. A. B., Frutuoso e Melo, P. F., & Fonseca, R. A. (2014). A critical review of methods and models for evaluating organizational factors in Human Reliability Analysis. *Progress in Nuclear Energy*, 75, 25-41. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnucene.2014.04.004>
- [12] Rodriguez, M., Diaz, I. 2016. A systematic and integral hazards analysis technique applied to the process industry. *Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries*, 43, 721-729. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2016.06.016
- [13] Hollnagel, E. P. (2012). FRAM : The Functional Resonance Analysis Method: Modelling Complex Socio-technical Systems. Farnham, GB: Ashgate.
- [14] Patriarca, R., Di Gravio, G., Costantino, F. A Monte Carlo evolution of the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) to assess performance variability in complex systems (2017) *Safety Science*, 91, pp. 49-60.
- [15] Lin, Z.-L., Huang, Y.-S., & Fang, C.-C. (2015). Non-periodic preventive maintenance with reliability thresholds for complex repairable systems. *Reliability Engineering & System Safety*, 136, 145-156.
- [16] Hollnagel, E. (1998). CREAM — A Second Generation HRA Method. In *Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM)*. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd
- [17] Yang, M., Gao, J., Zhao, B., Huang, X., Shen, Z. 1997. Study of operator reliability in nuclear power plants. *Chinese Science Bulletin*, 42(19), 1585-1590. doi:10.1007/bf02882562

Thanks!

Questions and Comments?

Mengxi Yu
yuxxx433@tamu.edu