

Threat Modeling Primer

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Agenda

- Why Security is a Systems Problem
- Introduction to Threat Modeling
 - Understanding and Decomposing the system
 - Modeling Assets
 - Modeling Controls
 - Modeling Threat Agents
 - Interpreting the Model


About Me

- Lead Embedded Consulting Practice
- Industry Participation
 - AAMI TIR 57 – Medical Device Security Risk Management
 - FDA and MITRE panels and working groups
 - CTA CEB33 co-chair Consumer Electronics – Security Program and Implementations
 - IEEE Center for Secure Design –
 - Building Code for Building Code
 - Automotive Secure Design
 - SAE and RTCA
- Prior to Synopsys
 - 18 years in product development building complex systems
 - Software, Systems and Security Engineering
 - DFSS Green Belt; Black Belt
- Industry Experience
 - Past Certifications: GSEC, GCIA, GCIH, GWAPT, GMOB, GCPM



Security Is A Systems Problem

Systems Engineering Owns Security

- Security is an emergent property
- Complexity creates emergent properties
- Complexity is managed by SE
- Therefore, Security is managed by SE
- SE most efficiently addresses



MITRE



Introduction to Threat Modeling

What Is Threat Modeling?

Threat modeling (TM) is software design analysis that looks for security weaknesses by juxtaposing software design views against a set of threat agents:

- Identifies secure-design weaknesses
 - Missing security controls
 - Weak or inappropriate security controls
 - Potential vulnerabilities
- Finds weaknesses that cannot be found by other techniques
- Does not replace penetration testing, secure code review, or any other security activity

All models are wrong, but some are useful.

- George Box

Threat Modeling Vocabulary



Approaches to Threat Modeling

- Attack trees
- Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle
- Synopsys

Common theme ... find flaws ... potentially think outside of your comfort zone


Attack Tree

- An attack tree has a root node, child nodes, and leaves
- Root node is the goal, or a component prompting the analysis
- Child nodes are refinements of the goal
- Leaf nodes are attacks that satisfy the condition described by the parent node
 - Sometimes **any** leaf node will satisfy the condition (OR)
 - Sometimes **all** leaf nodes will satisfy the condition (AND)

Attack Tree

Simple attack tree example from 1999 Schneier paper

– https://www.schneier.com/academic/archives/1999/12/attack_trees.html



Microsoft SDL

Microsoft's threat modeling methodology:

- One of cornerstones of Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) that promotes its performance at design phase of the software development process
- Is highly dependent on data-flow analysis
- Uses the STRIDE risk categorization
 - Based on the fact that attackers interact with their targets via data
 - Therefore, understanding system entry points, exit points and internal data flows critical to identify vectors leading to potentially vulnerable system components

Microsoft provides a free, extensible, threat modeling tool.

STRIDE

- STRIDE is a risk categorization scheme:

Spoofing

Tampering

Repudiation

Information Disclosure

Denial of Service

Escalation of Privilege

- STRIDE is a subcomponent of Microsoft's threat modeling methodology—often confused with the methodology itself

Synopsys Threat Modeling Process

Threat Modeling Process


Threat modeling process includes the following steps:

- Define scope and depth of analysis
- Gain understanding of what is being threat modeled
 - Decompose and model the software
- Model the attack possibilities
 - Identify assets, security controls, and threat agents
 - Juxtapose attack possibilities and software model
- Interpret the threat model
 - Produce a list of attacks
- Create the traceability matrix for reporting the attacks
 - Propose mitigations


Decompose and Model the System

- Understand how the system works (before trying to break it)
 - Who uses the system
 - What are the business goals
 - What are the dependencies between systems
 - System depends on what inputs?
 - What outputs do other systems depend on?
- Review documents already created
 - Interface Control Documents
 - System Architecture
 - Subsystem Architecture/Requirements
- Cross-disciplinary team is key


Simplified System Model




Model the Attack Possibilities: Assets



Model the Attack Possibilities: Security Controls




Model the Attack Possibilities: Threat Agents



System Threat Model

Characteristics of the system threat model include:

- Provides holistic view of application's security posture
- Considers both application and infrastructure
- Builds roadmap for additional security activities



Interpret the Threat Model

To interpret the threat model, start with threat agent and follow flow-of-control paths to reach an asset:

- Is there any path where threat agent can reach asset without going through a control?
- For any security control along each of those paths:
 - What must threat agent do to defeat the control?
 - Can threat agent defeat the control?

Record missing or weak controls in the traceability matrix.

Traceability Matrix—In One Sentence


“A **threat agent**, trying to compromise some **asset**, using **attack**, interacting via **attack surface**, in order to achieve **attack goal**, having **impact**, mitigated to an acceptable risk level by **security control**.”

Threat Agent	Asset	Attack	Attack Surface	Attack Goal	Impact	Security Control
Threat Agent	Asset compromised	Actual exploit	Entry point used by attacker	Goal of attack	Impact	Mitigation advice

Protocol/Sequence/API Threat Model

Characteristics include:

- Analysis of message structure and component interaction
- Importance of message order or flow



In Summary

- Understand different techniques used for threat modeling
- Understand the threat modeling process and methodology using the Synopsys method as an example
- Use Synopsys threat modeling approach for analyzing applications and systems