



# Rolls-Royce

## Certainty, Risk and Gambling in the Development of Complex Systems

**Andrew C Pickard,  
Chief of Process, Controls Engineering**

**Andrew J Nolan,  
Chief of Software Improvements - Software Centre of Excellence**

**Richard Beasley,  
Systems Engineering Specialist and Corporate Skill Owner  
*Rolls-Royce plc***

**©2010 Rolls-Royce plc**


The information in this document is the attribute of Rolls-Royce plc and may not be copied or communicated to a third party, or used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied without the express written consent of Rolls-Royce plc.

This information is given in good faith based upon the latest information available to Rolls-Royce plc, no warranty or representation is given concerning such information, which must not be taken as establishing any contractual or other commitment binding upon Rolls-Royce plc or any of its subsidiary or associated companies.


# Presentation Structure

- Impact of Scrap and Rework in the Engineering Process
- Requirements Uncertainty
- Cost Impact of Late Change and Escapes
- Risk and Technical Risk Management
- Root Causes for not performing Technical Risk Management
- Technical Risk Maturity Assessment
- Risk Checklists
- Technical Risk Management Metrics
- Benefits of Technical Risk Management
- Conclusions

# The Cumulative Effect of Scrap




# Scrap Rate and Iterations to Maturity



# Historic Volatility

Requirements Uncertainty At Key Project Phases




**CDR = Critical Design Review**


**EIS = Entry into Service**

**EIS + 1 = Entry into Service + 1 Year**

# Most Uncertainty is self generated



# Where is the Uncertainty?



Only a small % of uncertainty is a surprise

# Cost of Late Detection - Example 1


Software Problem Report Analysis		Should have been found during: -->												Key:	Cost Weight	Cost if found at right stage	Actual cost	
		Matlab Animating	Reviewing	Application S/W Building	Low Level Testing	S/W Verification Testing	HSI Testing	System Verification Testing	Hardware Rig Testing	Engine Testing	Airframe Testing	Flight Testing	In Service					
Matlab Animating	0.5%														1	0.032	0.005	
Reviewing	1.3%	55%													1	0.798	0.566	
Application S/W Building		0.7%	1.4%												1	0.014	0.021	
Low Level Testing	0.2%	2.6%		0.8%											1	0.012	0.035	
S/W Verification Testing		0.8%				0.4%									5	0.031	0.060	
H/W - S/W Integration Testing		1.0%					0.5%								5	0.080	0.077	
System Verification Testing	0.9%	9.9%		0.4%	0.2%	0.8%	5.0%								25	1.592	4.301	
Hardware Rig Testing	0.0%	1.3%						0.1%	0.4%						50	0.376	0.907	
Engine Testing	0.1%	1.6%		0.0%		0.2%	0.4%	0.2%	1.6%						50	0.885	2.057	
Airframe Testing	0.0%	3.8%				0.1%	0.6%				1.2%				50	0.796	2.875	
Flight Testing	0.0%	2.3%		0.0%			0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.4%	0.4%	1.5%			50	0.774	2.433	
In Service		0.5%						0.0%	0.0%				0.0%	0.1%		200	0.177	1.415
<b>Total Escapes</b>	2.7%	25%	0.0%	0.4%	0.2%	1.1%	1.4%	0.4%	0.1%	0.4%	0.0%				31.2%			
<b>Total</b>	3.2%	80%	1.4%	1.2%	0.6%	1.6%	6.4%	0.8%	1.8%	1.6%	1.5%	0.1%			100.0%	<b>Total:</b>	5.567	14.752
																<b>Cost Ratio:</b>	265%	

# Cost of Late Detection - Example 2

Software Problem Report Analysis		Requirements Validation	Requirements review	Design Review	Code Review	Segment test	Software verification	System verification	Bench/Test Rig	Engine d'vt test	Engine cert test	Flight test	Flight in service	Key:	Cost Weight	Cost if found at right stage	Actual cost
Found during:	Should have been found during: -->																
Requirements Validation	7.2%													1	0.171	0.072	
Requirements Review	6.2%	22%												1	0.439	0.285	
Design Review	1.6%	5.7%	4.3%											1	0.171	0.116	
Code Review	0.5%	3.8%	1.9%	5.7%										1	0.115	0.119	
Segment test		0.0%	0.1%	0.4%	0.2%									5	0.009	0.039	
Software Verification		2.5%	4.2%	3.8%		1.5%								25	0.701	3.000	
System verification	0.8%	7.0%	1.1%	0.2%		0.9%	2.0%							25	0.644	3.034	
Bench/Test Rig	0.0%	0.5%	2.5%	1.3%			0.0%	0.3%						50	0.276	2.368	
Engine d'vt test		0.1%	0.4%					0.1%	0.2%					50	0.207	0.414	
Engine cert test	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%			0.1%	0.1%		0.1%	0.0%				50	0.092	0.828	
Flight Test	0.1%	1.2%	1.1%	0.1%		0.3%	0.3%	0.0%	0.1%		0.4%			50	0.529	1.862	
Flight in Service	0.2%	0.3%	1.0%				0.0%	0.0%		0.2%	0.7%	2.2%		200	4.322	9.195	
Total Escapes	10%	22%	13%	5.9%	0.0%	1.3%	0.6%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	1.1%			54%			
Total	17%	44%	17%	12%	0.2%	2.8%	2.6%	0.6%	0.4%	0.2%	1.1%	2.2%		100%			
														Total:	7.676	21.331	
														Cost Ratio:	278%		

# Accelerating Evolution

10




# Certainty, Risk and Gambling

Behavior	Characteristics	Outcome	Mitigation
Unwarranted Certainty	<p>"Can do" culture.</p> <p>Better to be certain and wrong than uncertain and right</p>	Late change and rework	Change the emphasis at design gate reviews - the project must show rationale for certainty and a plan to manage residual uncertainty
Gambling	"Tick in the box"		Change the emphasis at design gate reviews - the project must show rationale for certainty and a plan to manage residual uncertainty
	Identified - nothing done with the results		demonstrate that the plan is being executed
Technical Risk Management	Technical Risks identified and managed	Reduced rework Earlier product maturity	See later


*In general Scrap & Rework is the manifestation of un-mitigated risk*

# Risk Categories




# Differences Between Project and Technical Risk Management

Aspect	Traditional Project Risk Management	Technical Risk Management
Purpose	Focus is on risk (uncertainty) in the project	Focus is on risk (uncertainty) in the product
Attendees	Tends to be project leaders, managers and team leaders	Technical Leads, team members and appropriate technical experts
Measures	Risk Performance measures – are we managing the risk	Technical Maturity measures – are we reducing Scrap/Rework.
Dominant skill	Project Management & Risk Management	Technical & domain experience
Tools	Standard risk management tools and templates	Addition of product related attributes and associated risks
Granularity	Will tend to be larger risks	Will tend to look at larger number of smaller risks



# Root Cause for not performing TRM

## Root Cause Analysis Summary Why Technical Risk Management is Not Performed




# Technical Risk Maturity Levels

25 requirements based on  
CMMI, the Major Project  
Association and RR Risk  
Maturity model

## Level 0 kids stuff

Do nothing. The project is open loop with regard to technical risks. Without evidence the project must assume it will be at level 0.



## Level 1 Minimum

Do something even if it's not planned, documented or formalised. Relies on good managers to make it happen



Level 2  
Pragmatic  
Define, plan and govern the Technical Risk Management activities – it's not enough to do Technical Risk Management, we need to also do it in the right way.




Level 3  
Ideal  
Seeking high performance through the use of measurement, specialists involvement, stakeholder involvement




Number of requirements

# Risk Types and Project Lifecycle



# Common Risk (and Opportunity) Classes



# Common Mitigation Classes

```

graph TD
    RM((Risk Mitigation)) --- ATS[Architecture Trade Study]
    RM --- R[Review]
    RM --- EPOC[Early proof of concept]
    RM --- F&F[Find & Fix]
    RM --- DFX[DFX - Design for volatility]
    RM --- DG[Design Guidance]
    RM --- SE[Stakeholder engagement]
    RM --- Pfv[Plan for volatility]
  
```

- **Architecture Trade Study**
  - IPT - Controls
  - IPT -- Controls & Stakeholders
  - Concept proposal review
- **Review**
  - Friendly review
  - Independent review
  - Review by Domain Expert
- **Early proof of concept**
  - Prototype - stand alone
  - Prototype in existing control system
  - Modelling - Control System
  - Modelling - Control System + Engine
  - Modelling - Control System + Airframe
- **Find & Fix**
  - Airframe Test Rig or Aircraft
  - Engine Test Rig Exposure
  - Integration Test Exposure (HSI, ES37)
- **DFX - Design for volatility**
  - Robust Design
  - Configurable design
  - Plug & Play architecture
  - Auto code generation
- **Design Guidance**
  - Design Guide
  - Lessons Learnt
  - Learn from historic projects
  - RIPL
- **Stakeholder engagement**
  - On site stakeholder representation
  - Visibility of stakeholder risks
  - Joint risk management sessions
  - Stakeholder reviews
- **Plan for volatility**
  - Delay the Function
  - Plan for design iteration
  - Delay freeze of design/requirements
  - If all else fails, plan in contingency


# Target mitigations around the risk class

Risk Class	Mitigation
Engine/Airframe Maturing	Delay until mature or develop configurable functions or form an IPT
Implementation risk	Reviews, Verification & Validation
Complex function	Prototype or use Find & Fix
Novel function	Establish IPT or seek precedence from other areas.
Lack of experience	Use design guides, Lessons Learnt or hold a review with experts outside of the team


The more precisely you can define a risk, the more precisely you can target a viable mitigation

# Risk Sources

21



# Hierarchy of Risks - RISC




Return to Summary Risk List	Show as Risk	Impact 1	Impact 2	Show Particular Instances	Comments
Risk Area	Specific Risk	Potential Consequences	Generic Mitigation	Is Risk	
Complexity	If the function requires (e.g. many interfaces) to be implemented in parallel	Complex functions can result in higher cost and longer delivery times	Only exposure to representative test environment	Yes	
Complexity	Is a large modification being made to the functionality of the system?	Large modifications can result in higher cost and delivery times	Only relevant and early risk exposure	Yes	
Complexity	Is the system typically difficult to get right or buy right?	Complex systems are typically difficult to get right or buy right	Only relevant and early risk exposure	Yes	
Conflicts	Show any Interface Conflict	Document addresses all potential conflicts in alternative designs?	Is the conflict for the necessary conflict to be resolved. Note that a 'traditional' amount of change in estimates and analysis is required to resolve the conflict.	Yes	
Conflicts	Show any Interface Conflict	If no changes to design that are not covered by the conflict are required, is the conflict being resolved in interface issues?	Is the conflict for the necessary conflict to be resolved. Note that a 'traditional' amount of change in estimates and analysis is required to resolve the conflict.	Yes	
Conflicts	Show any Interface Conflict	If no changes to design that are not covered by the conflict are required, is the conflict being resolved in interface issues?	Is the conflict for the necessary conflict to be resolved. Note that a 'traditional' amount of change in estimates and analysis is required to resolve the conflict.	Yes	
Design	Are analyses and inputs to the design correct?	If no, frequently this data is used in the wrong way. This can lead to significant cost increases and potential safety issues.	Using CDR to evaluate data from design. The aim is to identify any potential issues and mitigate them as early as possible. Ensure any found issues are resolved before CDR.	Yes	
Design	Are any interfaces within the system correct?	If any changes to the design that impact these interfaces are required, is the conflict being resolved in interface issues?	Using CDR to evaluate data from design. The aim is to identify any potential issues and mitigate them as early as possible. Ensure any found issues are resolved before CDR.	Yes	
Design	Are any interfaces within the system correct?	If any changes to the design that impact these interfaces are required, is the conflict being resolved in interface issues?	Using CDR to evaluate data from design. The aim is to identify any potential issues and mitigate them as early as possible. Ensure any found issues are resolved before CDR.	Yes	
Design	Is the design then released for mechanical integrity and durability?	If no, frequently this data is used in the wrong way. This can lead to significant cost increases and potential safety issues.	Using appropriate analyses and seek expert guidance and advice.	No	
Design	Does a component from another manufacturer have the correct interface to the system?	If no, the engine may fail to interface correctly with the system. This can lead to significant cost increases and potential safety issues.	Consider adding tracking features (like a required when fitting a component) to ensure the correct interface is achieved between functionality, cost and performance.	Yes	
Design	Does the design meet the requirements in the specification?	If no, frequently this data is used in the wrong way. This can lead to significant cost increases and potential safety issues.	Using CDR to evaluate data from design. The aim is to identify any potential issues and mitigate them as early as possible. Ensure any found issues are resolved before CDR.	Yes	
Design	Have appropriate design notes and drawings been provided?	If no, frequently this data is used in the wrong way. This can lead to significant cost increases and potential safety issues.	Ensure the designs have notes that can be traced to use of the correct interface.	Yes	
Design	Have sufficient opportunity been given to evaluate site design?	If no, frequently this data is used in the wrong way. This can lead to significant cost increases and potential safety issues.	Ensure the interfaces meet the requirements in the specification.	Yes	
Design	Does the engine gearbox handle the correct interface?	If no, frequently this data is used in the wrong way. This can lead to significant cost increases and potential safety issues.	Obtain an analysis of the impact of switch current on the TMA with respect to weight, shaft wind-up and gear loads.	No	
Design	Have you consulted the Activities and Lessons Learned?	If no, some data may be missing.	Use of Activities and Lessons Learned	Yes	
Design	Have you consulted the Activities and Lessons Learned?	If no, some data may be missing.	Use of Activities and Lessons Learned	Yes	
Design	Have you consulted the Activities and Lessons Learned?	If no, some data may be missing.	Use of Activities and Lessons Learned	Yes	
Design	Have you consulted the Activities and Lessons Learned?	If no, some data may be missing.	Use of Activities and Lessons Learned	Yes	
Design	Have you consulted the Activities and Lessons Learned?	If no, some data may be missing.	Use of Activities and Lessons Learned	Yes	
Design	Have you consulted the Activities and Lessons Learned?	If no, some data may be missing.	Use of Activities and Lessons Learned	Yes	
Design	Have you consulted the Activities and Lessons Learned?	If no, some data may be missing.	Use of Activities and Lessons Learned	Yes	



## Risk Identification Source Checklist

Return to Introduction	Selected Category:	Sensors
#	Risk/Issue	Comments/Mitigation
619	Are thermocouples with Mineral Insulated (MI) cable being used?	Low readings associated with oxidation of KP wires. Investigation showed that greater oxidation may occur in MI cables that have thermocouple materials not conductive to Sulfur Dioxide. Note - Copper conductors are not affected by this corrosion problem.
639	Has radiated heat been considered in the design of a thermocouple?	Consider a change in insulator material - for instance, Magnesium Oxide.
644	Have pressure switch settings been validated using early flight test pressure data?	The LP pressure feedback switch setting was higher than required and resulted in inappropriate cockpit cautionary messages during engine idle and anti-icing system activation. Ensure the correct low pressure switch point is captured in the system ICD and validated in the flight test program.
645	Are any welds specified in the design of sufficient strength to meet structural loading requirements consistently without failure?	Pressure switches failed at partial penetration edge-welds during 30 hours/plane end-of-life test. This was due to an inherently stronger first generation butt weld allowed the 30 hours/plane vibration requirement to be met. Ensure that the configuration of welds and their load profiles have been considered before CDR.
656	Is a part potentially susceptible to high frequency vibration failure of internal components?	IGU failures during vibration testing. If you have a small sealed container with internal components that are resonating, consider use of damping fluid such as 200cSt Dowtyl Silicone. Damping fluid is a known solution to this problem, at the cost of a small increase in weight.
657	Are interfaces defined purely around a convenient physical boundary, or are functional boundaries also considered?	Different functional boundaries on one side of the interface will struggle to interface to an area of conflicting function. Taking into account the function of the design and allocating these functions completely to one or the other side of the interface results in faster resolution of interface issues.

# Measuring Success




# Technical Risk Management really works



The benefit:cost of Technical Risk Management is better than 100:1

Number of Change Requests



Similar size & similar phase Software projects



# Conclusions

- If no effort is made to control scrap and rework on a project, scrap rates of 50% can typically occur, leading to the program costing twice as much as it could have and requiring significantly more time to achieve a mature product.
- Contrary to expectations, changes in customer requirements are not a major driver of scrap and rework - most is internally generated by the development team.
- Systems Engineering and Technical Risk Management are critical in understanding and controlling the sources of scrap and rework
- Past experience (Lessons Learned, Technical Review Gate Actions) can provide a useful feedback mechanism to understand the technical risks that a new project may be facing
- Metrics are available to assess Technical Risk Management capability and effectiveness on a project
- Scrap and rework rates of less than 10% can be achieved, with benefit to cost ratios of better than 100:1