



# Rolls-Royce

## **Certainty, Risk and Gambling in the Development of Complex Systems**

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
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
# Presentation Structure

- **Impact of Scrap and Rework in the Engineering Process**
- **Requirements Uncertainty**
- **Cost Impact of Late Change and Escapes**
- **Risk and Technical Risk Management**
- **Root Causes for not performing Technical Risk Management**
- **Technical Risk Maturity Assessment**
- **Risk Checklists**
- **Technical Risk Management Metrics**
- **Benefits of Technical Risk Management**
- **Conclusions**

# The Cumulative Effect of Scrap




# Scrap Rate and Iterations to Maturity




# Historic Volatility

## Requirements Uncertainty At Key Project Phases



# Most Uncertainty is self generated

6



# Where is the Uncertainty?

	Knowns	Unknowns
Known	Known-Knowns (28% of uncertainty arises here) <i>We failed on implementation</i>	<div> <b>Risk Management to move from Known-Unknowns to Known-Knowns</b> </div>
Unknown	Unknown-Knowns <div> <b>Risk Identification Techniques to move from Unknown – X to Known - X</b> </div> <i>We knew but forgot</i>	Unknown-Unknowns <i>Surprises</i>

Only a small % of uncertainty is a surprise

# Cost of Late Detection - Example 1

Software Problem Report Analysis		Matlab Animating	Reviewing	Application S/W Building	Low Level Testing	S/W Verification Testing	HSI Testing	System Verification Testing	Hardware Rig Testing	Engine Testing	Airframe Testing	Flight Testing	In Service	Key:	Cost Weight	Cost if found at right stage	Actual cost
Should have been found during: -->																	
Found during:																	
Matlab Animating	0.5%														1	0.032	0.005
Reviewing	1.3%	55%													1	0.798	0.566
Application S/W Building		0.7%	1.4%												1	0.014	0.021
Low Level Testing	0.2%	2.6%		0.8%										2% to 4%	1	0.012	0.035
S/W Verification Testing		0.8%			0.4%									1% to 2%	1	0.012	0.035
H/W - S/W Integration Testing		1.0%				0.5%								< 1%	5	0.031	0.060
System Verification Testing	0.9%	9.9%		0.4%	0.2%	0.8%	5.0%								5	0.080	0.077
Hardware Rig Testing	0.0%	1.3%					0.1%	0.4%							25	1.592	4.301
Engine Testing	0.1%	1.6%		0.0%		0.2%	0.4%	0.2%	1.6%						50	0.376	0.907
Airframe Testing	0.0%	3.8%				0.1%	0.6%			1.2%					50	0.885	2.057
Flight Testing	0.0%	2.3%		0.0%			0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.4%	1.5%				50	0.796	2.875
In Service		0.5%					0.0%	0.0%			0.0%	0.1%			50	0.774	2.433
Total Escapes	2.7%	25%	0.0%	0.4%	0.2%	1.1%	1.4%	0.4%	0.1%	0.4%	0.0%			31.2%	200	0.177	1.415
Total	3.2%	80%	1.4%	1.2%	0.6%	1.6%	6.4%	0.8%	1.8%	1.6%	1.5%	0.1%		100.0%	Total:	5.567	14.752
																Cost Ratio:	265%




# Cost of Late Detection - Example 2

<div>Software Problem Report Analysis</div> <div>Should have been found during: --&gt;</div> <div>Found during:</div>		Requirements Validation	Requirements review	Design Review	Code Review	Segment test	Software verification	System verification	Bench/Test Rig	Engine d'vt test	Engine cert test	Flight test	Flight in service	<div>Key:</div> <div>&gt;= 8%</div> <div>4% to 8%</div> <div>2% to 4%</div> <div>1% to 2%</div> <div>&lt;1%</div>	Cost Weight	Cost if found at right stage	Actual cost	
		Requirements Validation	7.2%													1	0.171	0.072
		Requirements Review	6.2%	22%												1	0.439	0.285
Design Review	1.6%	5.7%	4.3%										1		0.171	0.116		
Code Review	0.5%	3.8%	1.9%	5.7%									1		0.115	0.119		
Segment test		0.0%	0.1%	0.4%	0.2%								5		0.009	0.039		
Software Verification		2.5%	4.2%	3.8%		1.5%							25		0.701	3.000		
System verification	0.8%	7.0%	1.1%	0.2%		0.9%	2.0%						25		0.644	3.034		
Bench/Test Rig	0.0%	0.5%	2.5%	1.3%			0.0%	0.3%					50		0.276	2.368		
Engine d'vt test		0.1%	0.4%					0.1%	0.2%				50		0.207	0.414		
Engine cert test	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%			0.1%	0.1%		0.1%	0.0%			50	0.092	0.828			
Flight Test	0.1%	1.2%	1.1%	0.1%		0.3%	0.3%	0.0%	0.1%		0.4%		50	0.529	1.862			
Flight in Service	0.2%	0.3%	1.0%				0.0%	0.0%		0.2%	0.7%	2.2%	200	4.322	9.195			
Total Escapes	10%	22%	13%	5.9%	0.0%	1.3%	0.6%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	1.1%		54%	Total:	7.676	21.331		
Total	17%	44%	17%	12%	0.2%	2.8%	2.6%	0.6%	0.4%	0.2%	1.1%	2.2%	100%	Cost Ratio:	278%			

# Accelerating Evolution

## Cost of Correcting Errors




# Certainty, Risk and Gambling

Behavior	Characteristics	Outcome	Mitigation
Unwarranted Certainty	"Can do" culture. Better to be certain and wrong than uncertain and right	Late change and rework	Change the emphasis at design gate reviews - the project must show rationale for certainty and a plan to manage residual uncertainty
Gambling	"Tick in the box"		Change the emphasis at design gate reviews - the project must show rationale for certainty and a plan to manage residual uncertainty
	Identified - nothing done with the results		demonstrate that the plan is being executed
Technical Risk Management	Technical Risks identified and managed	Reduced rework Earlier product maturity	See later

*In general Scrap & Rework is the manifestation of un-mitigated risk*


# Risk Categories

12




# Differences Between Project and Technical Risk Management

Aspect	Traditional Project Risk Management	Technical Risk Management
Purpose	Focus is on risk (uncertainty) in the project	Focus is on risk (uncertainty) in the product
Attendees	Tends to be project leaders, managers and team leaders	Technical Leads, team members and appropriate technical experts
Measures	Risk Performance measures – are we managing the risk	Technical Maturity measures – are we reducing Scrap/Rework.
Dominant skill	Project Management & Risk Management	Technical & domain experience
Tools	Standard risk management tools and templates	Addition of product related attributes and associated risks
Granularity	Will tend to be larger risks	Will tend to look at larger number of smaller risks



# Root Cause for not performing TRM

## Root Cause Analysis Summary Why Technical Risk Management is Not Performed




# Technical Risk Maturity Levels

25 requirements based on  
CMMI, the Major Project  
Association and RR Risk  
Maturity model

## Level 0

*kids stuff*


Do nothing. The project is open loop with regard to technical risks. Without evidence the project must assume it will be at level 0.



## Level 1

*Minimum*

Do something even if it's not planned, documented or formalised. Relies on good managers to make it happen



## Level 2

*Pragmatic*

Define, plan and govern the Technical Risk Management activities – it's not enough to do Technical Risk Management, we need to also do it in the right way.



## Level 3

*Ideal*


Seeking high performance through the use of measurement, specialists involvement, stakeholder involvement




Number of requirements




# Risk Types and Project Lifecycle



# Common Risk (and Opportunity) Classes



# Common Mitigation Classes




# Target mitigations around the risk class

Risk Class	Mitigation
Engine/Airframe Maturing	Delay until mature or develop configurable functions or form an IPT
Implementation risk	Reviews, Verification & Validation
Complex function	Prototype or use Find & Fix
Novel function	Establish IPT or seek precedence from other areas.
Lack of experience	Use design guides, Lessons Learnt or hold a review with experts outside of the team

The more precisely you can define a risk, the more precisely you can target a viable mitigation

# Risk Sources

21



# Hierarchy of Risks - RISC



Generic Risk Classes

(30)

Gate Review Risk List

(250)


Lessons Learned

(1600+)


Return to Introduction	Selected Category:	Sensors	Return to Introduction	Return to Introduction	Return to Introduction
619	Are thermocouples with Mineral Insulated (MI) cable being used?	Low readings associated with oxidation of KP wires. Investigation showed that preferential oxidation can occur in MI cables that have thermocouple materials as conductors and Silicon Dioxide as the MI insulator. Note - Copper conductors are not affected by this corrosion problem. Consider a change in insulator material - for instance, Magnesium Oxide	Yes	Yes	Yes
639	Has radiated heat been considered in the design of a thermocouple?	An end cap was fitted which shielded the thermocouple from the combustor whilst still allowing a gas flow past the thermocouple.	Yes	Yes	Yes
644	Have pressure switch settings been validated using early flight test pressure data?	The LP pressure feedback switch setting was higher than required and resulted in inappropriate cockpit cautionary messages during engine idle and anti-ice system activated on.	Yes	Yes	Yes
645	Are any welds specified in the design of sufficient strength to meet structural loading requirements consistently without failure?	Pressure switches failed at partial penetration edge welds during 30 hours/airplane endurance testing. Changing to an inherently stronger full penetration butt weld allowed the 30 hours/airplane vibration requirement to be met. Ensure that the configuration of welds and their load profiles have been considered before CDR.	Yes	Yes	Yes
656	Is a part potentially susceptible to high frequency vibration failure of internal components?	HCU failures during vibration testing. If you have a small sealed container with internal components that are resonating, consider use of damping fluid such as 200cSt Dimethyl Silicone. Damping fluid is a known solution to this problem, at the cost of a small increase in weight.	Yes	Yes	Yes
657	Are interfaces defined purely around a convenient physical boundary, or are functional boundaries also considered?	Different teams working on either side of the interface will struggle if the interface is in an area of conflicting design freedom. Taking into account the function of the design and allocating these functions completely to one or the other side of the interface results in faster resolution of interface issues.	Yes	Yes	Yes

Risk Identification Source Checklist

# Measuring Success



# Technical Risk Management really works





# Conclusions

- If no effort is made to control scrap and rework on a project, scrap rates of 50% can typically occur, leading to the program costing twice as much as it could have and requiring significantly more time to achieve a mature product.
- Contrary to expectations, changes in customer requirements are not a major driver of scrap and rework - most is internally generated by the development team.
- Systems Engineering and Technical Risk Management are critical in understanding and controlling the sources of scrap and rework
- Past experience (Lessons Learned, Technical Review Gate Actions) can provide a useful feedback mechanism to understand the technical risks that a new project may be facing
- Metrics are available to assess Technical Risk Management capability and effectiveness on a project
- Scrap and rework rates of less than 10% can be achieved, with benefit to cost ratios of better than 100:1