


Systems Verification Analysis Through RAM Simulation

Emmanuel Ohene Opare
NGNP Systems Engineer
June 23rd, 2010

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Contents

▶ Introduction

- Introduction
- Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)
- Next Generation Readiness Assurance Plant (RGNP)
-
- Why RAM Verification In Design?


▶ Why RAM Verification In Design?

- BlockSim Application
- V-Block Diagram
- RAM Activities @ Design Phases
- BlockSim

▶ Conclusion

- RAM Verification Activities @ System TRL's
- BlockSim

Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Project



“The country that can harness the power of hydrogen will be the country with the healthiest economy, the cleanest environment, and the strongest energy and national security,” said Senator Dorgan.

Beyond Electricity – Applications of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs)

HTSE and Thermo-Chemical Hydrogen Production
Coal Gasification


Steam Reforming of Natural Gas
Biomass Hydrothermal Gasification

Cogeneration of Electricity and Steam

Oil Shale and Oil Sand Processing

Petroleum Refining


Ethanol Concentration
Seawater Desalination
District Heating






High Temperature Gas Reactors can provide energy production that supports many industrial applications including petrochemical and petroleum industries

Solid Oxide Fuel vs. Electrolysis Cells


(High efficiency, long-term stability, fuel flexibility, low emissions, low cost, but higher temperature and material compatibility issues)



Systems Are Advanced Using Technology Readiness Level (TRL) to Assess Maturity



System Verification Tools Like BlockSim Enable the Assessment of Important System Metrics Like RAM



- Verification Asks...
 - Did you build it right?
- Verification Activities
 - Analysis
 - Demonstration
 - Inspection
 - Certification
 - Testing
 - Acceptance Test
 - Development Test
 - Qualification Test
 - Operational Test


Customers Complain About System RAM Not Design, When They Own the System

- “This !#%\$#@ car has only one reliable part, and that’s the wood paneling!!”
- “I bought this car to replace my Corolla. My tires have a bubble in them after a month of ownership. I had to recharge *my car* battery the other day and the air bags just went off – all 4 at the same time! The radio blew up on me the other day when I was setting the time. The car couldn’t start this morning... I had to use jumper cables.”
- What is RAM?
 - Interrelationship between Reliability and Maintainability and their impact on Availability

What is Reliability?

- Likelihood an item will successfully perform a required function under stated conditions without failure for a specified period of time

$$\text{Probability of Failure: } F(t) = \int_0^t f(s) ds$$



$$\text{Reliability: } R(t) = 1 - F(t)$$

What is Maintainability?

- Measure of the degree to which a system, product or service can be returned from a failed state to a functioning state within time limits established by a performance standard

$$\text{Lognormal Distribution : } M(t) = \int_0^T \frac{1}{\sigma T \sqrt{2\pi}} e^{\frac{-1}{2} \left(\frac{t-\bar{T}}{\sigma T} \right)^2} dt$$

— Where

- \bar{T} = Mean of natural logs of times-to-repair
- σT = Standard deviation of natural logs of times-to-repair

- Note: Be consistent with how you define repair time
 - Time to access failed parts, procure or deliver parts to perform repair
 - Time to successfully diagnose cause of failure
 - Time it takes to remove failed components & replace with functioning ones

What is Availability?


- Likelihood that a system has not failed or undergoing repair when it is needed
 - Operational Availability:
 - Measure of average availability over a period of time and it includes all experienced sources of down time, such as administrative, logistics, preventative and corrective maintenance downtimes, etc.

$$A_0 = \frac{\text{Uptime}}{\text{Operational Cycle}}$$

- *Where*
 - *Uptime* = *Total time the system was functioning during operational cycle*
 - *Operational cycle* = *Overall time period of operation being investigated*

Why RAM Verification During Design?

- RAM Verification:
 - Identifies unseen and avoidable failures in system
 - Influences system design
 - Influences system facility design and planning
 - Ensures Total Ownership Cost (TOC) is within constraints of customer





Source: *Common sense on Reliability Engineering*, Albertyn Banard


Why RAM Verification During Design Continued...?

Factor of 10 Rule: $\$ \times 10^n$


The cost of not addressing reliability issues increases tenfold as system matures




Verifying System RAM at Conceptual Phase Reduces Ownership Risk and Cost



Planning RAM Verification Activities With Design Maturity In TRL Space Ensures System Robustness




System Vulnerability Determined Through RAM Analysis Are Addressed In Risk Management Space



System Level Results

Final Ave RVI Risk Score 0.97

RAM Verification and Technology Maturation Activities are Iterative Processes



Next Generation Nuclear Plant

TRL: Technology Readiness Level

Is RAM Verification Possible at the Conceptual Phase?


- **Common Barriers**

- Unclear system design concept
 - Uncertain and vague requirements


- **Rules of Thumb**

- Most new technologies, products or systems are built from existing technologies which are reconfigured or readjusted in new ways to perform new functions
 - Most failure in new systems are caused when old system elements are reconfigured in new ways

Defining And Establishing System Boundary



Granularity of System Decomposition is Based on What You Can Take Action on



Functional Decomposition of HTSE System Establishes Relationship Between System Elements

Water Input

Water supply system

Water Conditioning

Water purification system

Water /Gas Transport

Water recycle pump

Sweep water recycle pump

Water pump

Sweep water pump

H₂ recirculator

HTSE piping

Mixing chamber

Water Heat up

Sweep hi-temp recuperator

High-temp steam/H₂ recuperator

Steam/H₂ topping heater

Sweep gas topping heater

Steam generator 1

Steam generator 2

Water Dissociation

Solid Oxide Electrolyzers


Product Handling

Water separation tank hydrogen product



Water/oxygen separation tank oxygen product

NN



System Elements Configured in a Reliability Block Diagram



BlockSim – Design & Verification Tool, Uses RAM Data to Estimate System Operational Performance Over Time



A good reliability requirement has a time factor





A screenshot of the Simulation Results Explorer window. On the left, a tree view shows categories like General Summary, System, Blocks, Crews, Spare Pools, Simulation, and Reports. The Reports section is expanded, showing various ranking and event logs. On the right, a table titled "Block Cost Ranking" is displayed, showing a list of components with their total costs. The table has columns for Rank, Block Name (Diagram), and Total Cost.


A	B	
Block Cost Ranking		
	Block Name (Diagram)	Total Cost
1		
2	Module 1 {Electrolysis1}	1545270.334
3	Module 1 {Electrolysis1}	1334707.972
4	Sweep Gas Topping Heater {Topping Heater}	58454.563
5	Steam/H2 Topping Heater {Topping Heater}	53098.1392
6	SG2 {Steam Generators}	35567.4035
7	SG1 {Steam Generators}	33280.561
8	Water/H2 Separation Tank {Separation Tank}	29870.7456
9	Water/O2 Separation Tank {Separation Tank}	29637.5717
10	H2 Recirculator {Recirculator}	14144.3706
11	Sweep Hi Temp Recup {All Recuperators}	2640.9228
12	Water Pump {Water Pumps}	2595.6313
13	Water Pump {Water Pumps}	2546.3583
14	Sweep Water Recycle Pump {Recycle Water Pumps}	2163.1324
15	Sweep Low Temp Recup {All Recuperators}	2120.3113
16	Sweep Water Recycle Pump {Recycle Water Pumps}	2064.8975
17	Hi Temp Steam/H2 Recup {All Recuperators}	964.3721
18	Motor Operated Valve6 {MOV}	882.2221
19	Relief/valve A {RPV}	872.5721
20	Low Temp Steam/H2 Recup {All Recuperators}	867.3721
21	Block 1 {Steam Generators}	0

BlockSim Outputs: Knowing the Right Metric to Measure is Important


Downing Event Criticality Index



Result: 83 % Operational Availability @ TRL 10, if cell reliability is doubled @ each TRL




Addressing Big Hitters While Doubling Cell Reliability Improves System Operational Availability



Translating What 96% Operational Availability Means for the Customer Can Influence Decision Making



Tradeoff Between TOC and Operational Availability



Verification Process Using RAM Simulation

1. Define requirements and decide method to verify requirements
2. Write system description document
3. Define system boundary
4. Perform functional decomposition of system
5. Select appropriate RAM tool
6. Collect appropriate data
7. Compute and verify system RAM against requirements
 - Optional: External certification
8. Communicate results to stakeholders and decision makers

Take Away

- Use RAM simulation to:
 - Identify tasks to enhance roadmap and reduce risk
 - Inform concept selection by estimating system TOC impact on enterprise
 - Verify and provide basis to inform system performance





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
Contact:
emmanuel.opare@inl.gov
208.526.0189
Charles.park@inl.gov
208.526.1091

Best References

- **Practical Reliability Engineering 4th Edition**, Patrick O' Connor, David Newton, and Richard Bromley. John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2002.
- **System Analysis, Design, and Development: Concepts, Principles, and Practices**, Wasson, Charles. John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2006. 615-49.
- **Engineering robust designs with Six Sigma Creveling**, Clyde, Jeff Slutsky, Dave Antis, Clyde Creveling, and John Wang. Prentice Hall, 2005. 449-66,687-705.
- **Department of Energy Office of Field Management/Office of Project and Fixed Asset Management**, Good Practice Guide: RMA Planning. GPG-FM-004. 1996.
- Fundamentals of Design For Reliability, ReliaSoft RS 560 Training.

Doubling Cell Reliability Does Not Meet Target Operational Availability (90%) at TRL 10

- Remedy
 - Redundancy in module design and/or address other big hitters



RAM Verification Ensures the System is Built Right and Meets Customer RAM Expectations

- Systems Engineering role in RAM analysis is to:
 - Represent the voice of the customer in the design and fabrication process and not to replace the designer
- SE performs RAM verification throughout design cycle to:
 - Ensure system is built right and will satisfy customer requirements
 - Highlight the consequence of not addressing RAM
 - Relate customer system/product needs to enterprise bottom-line
 - Communicate potential barriers to achieving target metrics
 - Inform system design and development

Project Outcome


- Identify components that required significant research and development (R&D)
- Identified performance targets to be achieved as the system matures
- Identify design data needs (DDNs)
- Identify components requiring redundancy
- Clarify funding allocation as system transitions from TRL4 – TRL 5
- Enabled near- and long-term cost and schedule planning

RAM Analysis Data Sources

- GENERIC, Component Failure Database for Light Water and Liquid Sodium Reactor (EGG-SSRE-8875-1990) (EGG-1990)
- Nuclear Computerized Library for Assessing Reactor Reliability (NUCLARR)
- Industry-Average Performance for Components and Initiating Events at U.S Commercial Nuclear Power Plants – 2006 (NUREG)
- Generic component reliability data for research reactor PSA, IAEA-TECDOC-930 (IAEA-930)

Verification Tools – One Tool Does Not Fit All

Design for Reliability Stages & Activities



What RAM Activities Are Pursued @ Conceptual Phase ?

Design Phases	TRL	Criteria	High Level Concurrent RAM Activity
	1	Basic principles observed and reported.	
Planning	2	Technology concept and/or application formulated.	Create a system's description document and gather relevant data for RAM analysis
Planning → Pre-conceptual	3	Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept: Lab level for pieces of components.	Define system RAM requirements, and develop RAM program plan
Pre-conceptual → Conceptual	4	Lab-scale component validation in lab environment: Demonstrate technical feasibility and functionality. Beginning of integration of some interfacing components into sub-assemblies.	Perform a high level RAM analysis to identify system risks and vulnerabilities and recommend improvement methods.
Conceptual → Preliminary Design	5	Lab-scale component or sub-assembly validation in relevant environment. Beginning of integration of sub-assemblies into sub-systems.	Perform a high level RAM analysis to identify system risks and vulnerabilities and recommend improvement methods.
Preliminary Design → Detail Design	6	Subsystem model or prototypical scale demonstration in relevant environment.	Repeat RAM analysis to mitigate system vulnerabilities and improve system RAM.
Detail Design → Fabrication/ Construction	7	Subsystem prototype demonstration in an operational environment. Beginning integration of subsystems into complete system.	Address all system vulnerabilities through RAM analysis to improve system RAM before construction and deployment. Verify that system RAM will not be compromised by manufacturing constraints.

Data Used – Error Factor of 10 -15%

Table 2. HTSE process component failure rates.

HTSE Components	Comparable Components	Number of Components	Failures per Hour per Component	Failure Criticality Index (%)
Topping heaters and recuperators	Heat exchangers	4	1.45 E-05	34
Motor operated valves	Motor operated valves	24	1.14 E-05	28
Sweep, water, recycle pumps	Centrifugal pumps	4	3.50 E-05	15
Pressure relief valves	Pressure relief valves	10	1.06 E-05	10
Hydrogen recirculator	Compressor	1	6.00 E-05	6
O ₂ /H ₂ separation tanks	Condensers	2	1.45 E-05	4
Steam generators	Heat exchanger	2	1.45 E-05	3

External Verification Data Source

- Savannah River Site Generic Data Base Development (WSRC-TR-93-262, REV. 1) dated May 1982.
 - These data represent large gas systems, both at nuclear power plants and from Savannah River Site systems, and provide a starting point for analyzing component reliability.
- A number of approximations were necessary in order to apply comparable failure data for existing components to future
- HTSE process components that have not yet been designed. Error factors for each of these failure rates is 10, which indicates a reasonable level of confidence.

TRL Definitions

TRL	Technology Readiness Level Definition	TRL Abbreviated Definition
1	Basic principles observed and reported in white papers, industry literature, lab reports, etc. Scientific research without well defined application.	Basic principles observed
2	Technology concept and application formulated. Issues related to performance identified. Issues related to technology concept have been identified. Paper studies indicate potentially viable system operation.	Application formulated
3	Proof-of concept: Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proven in laboratory. Technology or component tested at laboratory scale to identify/screen potential viability in anticipated service.	Proof of Concept
4	Technology or Component is tested at bench scale to demonstrate technical feasibility and functionality. For analytical modeling, use generally recognized benchmarked computational methods and traceable material properties.	Bench scale testing
5	Component demonstrated at experimental scale in relevant environment. Components have been defined, acceptable <u>technologies</u> identified and technology issues quantified for the relevant environment. Demonstration methods include analyses, verification, tests, and inspection.	Component Verified at Experimental Scale

TRL Definitions


6	Components have been integrated into a subsystem and demonstrated at a pilot scale in a relevant environment.	Subsystem Verified at Pilot scale
7	Subsystem integrated into a system for integrated engineering scale demonstration in a relevant environment.	System demonstration at Engineering Scale
8	Integrated prototype of the system is demonstrated in its operational environment with the appropriate number and duration of tests and at the required levels of test rigor and quality assurance. Analyses, if used support extension of demonstration to all design conditions. Analysis methods verified and validated. Technology issues resolved pending qualification (for nuclear application, if required). Demonstrated readiness for hot startup	Integrated Prototype Tested and Qualified
9	The project is in final configuration tested and demonstrated in operational environment.	Plant Operational NGNP, First of a kind (FOAK)
10	Commercial-scale demonstration is achieved. Technological risks minimized by multiple units built and running through several years of service cycles.	Commercial Scale – Multiple Units Nth of a kind (NOAK)

Action To Be Taken To Address System Vulnerability Issues

Near-term needs include:

- Resolve cell delimitation issues
- Demonstrate SOEC performance at pressure
- Select a cell configuration and size
- Select balancing gas and use strategy
- Select air or steam sweep
- Select and procure a cell fabricator from industry
- Demonstrate increased cell area size
- Procure cells/stacks for testing in a pilot plant
- Design and build a pilot scale test facility

Target Cell Degradation for Future TRL Maturation



Assumptions For HTSE

1. The HTSE operating environment is similar to the operating environment of current high-temperature industrial processes and the failure data for similar components can be used
2. Subsystems and components are mature technologies, except the SOECs
3. Components developed by NGNP (generally for higher temperature and pressure) can be used for HTSE. Some R&D for high temperature oxygen and hydrogen handling will be required.
4. When one of the component types fails, the entire HTSE system fails because this initial analysis includes no redundancy (this is the customary assumption when analyzing systems prior to the completion of a pre-conceptual design)
5. When HTSE is down, the maintenance crew responsible for restoring the system to full operation will be well trained and able to restore the system within an acceptable time
6. Spares parts are available upon system failure
7. When failed parts are replaced, the entire system will be good as new
8. Target availability for NGNP systems is 83%
9. Failure distribution for the components does not include premature failures during the early stages of the system's operation
10. SOEC module failure occurs when hydrogen production decreases to 70% of capacity
11. Failure rates of mature SOECs (TRL-10) will be similar to failure rates for mature solid oxide fuel cells (SOFCs). Modules will be replaced every 6 years.
12. Current SOECs (TRL-4) are expected to have a useful life of about 9 months (6,000 hours). Subsequent failure rates will be reduced by $\frac{1}{2}$ (or performance duration doubled) at each of the subsequent TRL levels.
13. SOEC modules will be “replaced” by switching a valve resulting in no operational downtime

What is Project Risk?


- Includes Technical & Programmatic Risk

$$R = (P_e \times P_c) \times C$$

Indicates
“How risky is it?”

Risk
Likelihood

Loss if risk
occurs



Consequence Definition

Consequence	Technical	Schedule	Use for calculation (risk units)
Negligible	Minimal or no impact	Schedule delays that do not affect milestones or the critical path	1
Marginal	Small change needed to design or path forward. Minor damage to equipment or facilities. Minor, temporary loss of capabilities.	Schedule delays that may affect external milestones or are threatening a slip along the critical path	3
Significant	Moderate change needed to design or path forward. Moderate, but repairable damage to equipment or facilities. Moderate, temporary loss of capability.	Schedule delays that will slip the critical path end date by up to 6 months	5
Critical	Major change needed to design or path forward, workaround available. Significant, repairable damage to equipment or facilities.	Schedule delays that will slip the critical path end date by more than 6 months but less than 1 year	7
Crisis	Major change needed to design or path forward, no workaround available now. Loss of equipment or facilities.	Schedule delays that will slip the critical path end date 1 year (schedule slips in excess of 1 year are anticipated to cause a loss of the program)	9

Probability Definition

Probabilities	Range	Technology Criteria	Scale Criteria	Use for calculation
Beyond Design Basis	$< 10^{-4}$		Not evaluated since it is beyond the basis of the design	N/A
Very Unlikely	10^{-4} to 0.1%	Technology are well understood and are routinely used in similar, integrated applications and conditions.	The scale of the system/component needed is similar to existing successful applications.	0.1
Unlikely	0.1% to 1%	Technology is understood and has been used in applications and conditions close to, but not identical to required conditions. A small amount of development needed before deployment.	Majority of the components are similar in scale to existing applications.	0.3
Somewhat Likely	1% to 10%	Technology needs a moderate amount of research, development, and design before deployment at required operating conditions.	About half of components are similar in scale to existing applications.	0.5
Likely	10% to 50%	Technology needs a major amount of research, development, and design before deployment at required operating conditions.	Some of the components are scaled similar to existing applications, with the remainder needing significant design changes to achieve deployment.	0.7
Very Likely	> 50%	Low maturity; complex, unclear development path; multiple unproven technologies must work together.	All components needed have never been attempted at the necessary scale.	0.9

Risk = Probability X Consequence

Probability

Very Likely	Low 0.9	Moderate 2.7	High 4.5	Very High 6.3	Very High 8.1
Likely	Low 0.7	Moderate 2.4	High 4.4	Very High 6.1	Very High 7.9
Somewhat Likely	Low 0.5	Moderate 1.9	High 3.8	High 5.3	Very High 6.8
UnLikely	Very Low 0.3	Low 1.2	Moderate 2.6	High 4.2	High 5.4
Very Unlikely	Very Low 0.1	Low 0.5	Low 1.0	Moderate 1.8	Moderate 2.7
Consequence					
	Negligible	Marginal	Significant	Critical	Crisis

BlockSim Maintenance Tab

Block Properties (Module 2)

Maintenance

Maintenance Properties (Simulation Only)

Corrective | Preventive | Inspection

Can Maintain Correctively

Beta:

Eta:

Gamma:

Fixed Duration:

CM brings system down

Misc. Cost Per Action:

Item Group #:

Spare Part Pool

Electrolysis

Set As Default **Active Block: Module 2** **OK** **Cancel** **Help**