



26th annual **INCOSE**
international symposium

Edinburgh, UK
July 18 - 21, 2016

From Agile Systems Engineering to Agile Safety Engineering

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Contents

- Why Agile safety engineering?
- Agile safety engineering techniques,
- Case study.



Experience

- Eurofighter
- F-35 Lightning II
- A400M Brakes
- 787 Electrical Brakes
- Learjet 85 EPS
- MTU EPMU
- Bell 525 SPDS/ TRUs
- Pilatus PC-24 ISGS
- Pilatus PC-24 SPDS
- PCM for 777X Flight Controls
- PCM for C919 CCN
- Zee Aero 'flying car'



Why Agile Safety Engineering?




- Automation, complexity and integration (more ways things can fail):
 - Road vehicles,
 - Aircraft and;
 - Flying cars.
- Need for a 'lightweight' approach to safety engineering which becomes more rigorous as design matures.
 - Changes are cost prohibitive if made too late in the design life cycle,
 - The rigidity of safety requirements is in contrast to other requirements which can often be relaxed.

People really are putting autopilots in cars:



People really are building flying cars:



Source: U.S. Patent Office
John Blanchard / The Chronicle




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The V-model:

Multiple levels of FTA,
CCA, FMEA and
FMES,
Integration of different
levels is
challenging,
Inability to react to
unanticipated
change,
Aircraft can be over-
designed or under-
designed
(reliability impact
in addition to cost
impact).



Agile safety engineering techniques:



- Hybrid piece part/ functional Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA),
 - A functional FMEA if sufficient to show compliance to probability budgets,
 - A piece part FMEA if functional FMEA is insufficient,
 - Failure Mode Distributions (FMDs) if necessary.
- A framework with interchangeable models as opposed to a V-model,
 - Supports rapid reassessment as information becomes available.
- The removal of conservatism as needed in a step-by-step iterative fashion,
 - Steps are halted when compliance to probability budgets is achieved.
- Integration of the different interchangeable models.
 - Fabric joining interchangeable models does not need to be reestablished,
 - Rapid reassessment as product evolves,
 - Rapid reassessment as product is deployed to a new environment.


Case study 'flying car':



- No certification basis precedent,
 - Chicken and egg questions 'how much automation?
 - Unsettled certification basis. What is it?
- Overlapping iterations with a need to converge on a certifiable product,
 - What are the known deficiencies?
 - Are changes resulting in a more certifiable product?
 - Many unmanned and manned prototypes with several parallel paths.
- Automation, complexity and integration and a need to respond to changing requirements.
 - Unsettled mission profile,
 - Electronic flight control system,
 - Auto land/ takeoff and hover stabilisation.

Framework:

System FHAs validate
Aircraft FHA,
Fewer FTAs,
Careful selection and
abstraction of
effects shifts effort
away from FTAs,
Hybrid FMEAs reduce
effort,
FMES is glue between
FTAs and FMEAs
and is
automatically
generated.



Results 'flying car':

- Quick evaluation of many prototypes in parallel,
 - Effort completed within weeks by a small team,
 - Where information is missing conservatism is applied.
- Different mission profiles evaluated,
- Agile safety engineering framework is an integral part of effort,
 - Incorporation of independent over voltage/ over current protection,
 - High and low voltage power distribution architecture,
 - Incorporation of monitoring only as required to show compliance to probability budgets,
 - Most significant contributors to overall probability budgets identified and removed via a cut set analysis.
- Issue papers written where certification basis questions exist.
 - Complex COTs hardware common mode analysis,
 - Design Assurance Levels (DALs).