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A Research Agenda

Warranting System Validity Through a Holistic Validation Framework

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

GAO reports^{1,2} significant risk to launch reliability when validation in SE is missing





Expendable Launch Vehicle Acquisition – form and reform



Titans, Atlas, Delta
1960-1997




1998-1999



Atlas V, Delta IV
ULA 100+ successes 2000-present

Reduction of SE leaves systems acquirers open to a high risk of loss of mission



NOTIONAL Relative expenditure on Safety and Mission Assurance over the Space Transportation System Life Cycle

Source: NASA Safety and Mission Assurance, 2016

http://jsc-sma-mispp.jsc.nasa.gov/FSO/Lists/Assessment%20List/Attachments/3920/Shuttle_Legacy_Handout_RevA%20-%20main%20foldouts%20only.pdf

Waiting until you have a launch failure is a poor method for justifying more validation



Houston, we have a problem.



H-II (HTV-6) Resupply Mission (JAXA), 2015
Success




Commercial Resupply Service Missions
Falcon 9, Antares, Soyuz Russian)
2014-2015



Is there some particular logic to Validation in SE to justify validation criteria?

Agenda



US Space
Launch System
Validation Need

Validation in
Systems
Engineering

Research
Theory Base

Research
Agendas

Confusion regarding validation in systems engineering ..no definitive definitions



Qualification

↳ Certification

↳ Acceptance

Done right or Right done

Validate → Verify
“A before E”

Before Fabrication

Verification



Validation

Test

Inspection

Evaluation

Records

Analysis

VVT

T&E

Demonstration

Similarity

After Fabrication

Product Validation
System Validation

Validated

Criteria

Verity

Value

Validity Credibility

SH Expectations Validation
Con Ops Validation
Requirements Validation
Design Validation



Artificial systems have artificial validity criteria

- Engineered systems = Artificial systems
 - The engineered system will cause predefined alterations of effects
 - Effects would not manifest without existence and action of system
- Validation in Systems Engineering
 - Confirming through examination of objective evidence
 - Justification of belief that the novel pattern has some repeatable, predictable truth
 - Boundary validity negotiated
- A human process of involving human activity on human-created systems
 - Physical interrogation
 - Mental rationalization
 - Dialectical reasoning
 - Shared reasoning



Herb Simon
Sciences of the Artificial





Figure:
Definition and
usage of a
Validation
Action
(INCOSE SE
BKCASE)

Agenda





US Space
Launch System
Validation Need

Validation in
Systems
Engineering

**Research
Theory Base**

**Research
Agendas**

Focus on risk mitigation to determine validation strategy ignores a key validation question..



How do you know?



Interrogating a model to reason about the system



$$V = \sqrt{\frac{2(p_0 - p)}{\rho}}$$

$$Re_x = \frac{Ux}{\nu}$$

$$\frac{\tau_w}{\rho} = \frac{d}{dx}(U^2\theta) + \delta^* U \frac{dU}{dx}$$

$$\frac{u}{U} = \left(\frac{y}{\delta}\right)^{1/n} = \eta^{1/n}$$

$$C_L = \frac{F_L}{\frac{1}{2}\rho V^2 A}$$

$$C_D = \frac{F_D}{\frac{1}{2}\rho V^2 A}$$

$$F_D = \frac{(\pi \rho v^2 d^2)}{8} C_D$$

$$\frac{P_c - P_\infty}{\rho} = \frac{v^2}{2} (1 - 4 \sin^2 \theta)$$

$$C_r = \frac{P_c - P_\infty}{\frac{1}{2}\rho v^2} = 1 - 4 \sin^2 \theta$$

$$B = (1 - r^*) \sqrt{\frac{\omega^*}{2}}$$

$$\frac{\bar{u}^2}{K^2 / 2\omega^2} = 1 - \frac{2}{\sqrt{r^*}} e^{-B} \cos(B) + \frac{e^{-2B}}{r^*}$$

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t} \int_V W dV + \oint (F - G) dA = \int_V H dV$$

$$\vec{V} = v \left[\left(1 - \frac{a^2}{r^2} \right) \cos \theta \right] \hat{e}_r - v \left[\left(1 + \frac{a^2}{r^2} \right) \sin \theta \right] \hat{e}_\theta$$


Modeling relations in anticipatory systems is fundamental for engineered systems




Information encoding



Phenomenal
Actual
“Entity”



Contextual
Pattern-al
“Model”



$$u = g \left[\text{Isp} \ln \left(\frac{m_{v0}}{m_v} \right) - t \right]$$

$$h_b = g \left[-t_b \text{Isp} \frac{\ln \left(\frac{m_{v0}}{m_{v,\text{final}}} \right)}{\left(\frac{m_{v0}}{m_{v,\text{final}}} - 1 \right)} + t_b \text{Isp} - \frac{1}{2} t_b^2 \right]$$


Information decoding

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---------------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Mental Modeling Theory
Johnson-Laird, 1983;
Johnson-Laird &
Khemplani, 2014 | Expert Systems
O’Keeffe et al,
1987 | Systems Thinking
Senge, 1990 | Systems Engineering,
Hall, 1999;
Sage & Armstrong,
2000;
Buede, 2000;
Roda, 2013 | Artificial Systems Science
Simon, 1983 | Model Validation
Sargent in Pace, 2001 | IS Design Theory
Gregor, 2006;
Gregor and Jones,
2007;
many more | Ecological Systems, Policy
Kineman, 2007 | Physics Pedagogy
Hestenes, 2010 | Cognitive Science
Nersessian, 2012 |
|--|---|---------------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|

September 8, 2017

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Contextual models do not exist on evidence alone; An inferential structure is necessary



Stephen Toulmin
Model of Argumentation

Jansson and Sage, 1998 –
Argument and Inference in SE

Sage and Armstrong, 2000 –
Argument and Inference in SE

Metcalf and, Sastrowardoyo,
2013 – Argument Mapping

Graydon and Holloway, 2016
– Confidence in Assurance
Arguments

Toulmin's model of argumentation links “Grounds” to the “Claim” by “Warrants”




Warranting system validity needs a holistic validation framework

Step 1: Recognize the Core


Elements of Toulmin's model of argumentation

Step 2: Recognize the Knowledge Base




and..

A holistic framework of validation draws on the knowledge base in ways that affect value



Agenda




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

**Research
Agendas**

Opportunities for research are everywhere




Systems of Systems of Agents
– Values frame judgments and commitment agreements between players, establishing the ultimate “truth” by which validity is judged

Model Based Systems Engineering
changes how to communicate models and establish agreement regarding the single source of “truth”




NASA Integrated Modeling Architecture for MBE (Gill 2013)



(credit: NASA/Joel Kowsky)



Online & Wired –
Technology and sociality are changing how to communicate models and need to enable discernment of truth



Notional Eliminate Argumentation (Goodenough, Weinstock, and Klein, 2015)

Safety and Mission Assurance, risk and hazards analysis organizes key information but probabilistic methods have yet to be developed to produce justified expert assessment of confidence in assurance arguments (Graydon & Holloway, 2016)

Research goal: Develop the theory that justifies validation criteria in systems engineering



Robert Rosen



Imre Lakatos




Stephen Toulmin



Research Validation Criteria

- Traditional qualitative research validation criteria
- Illustration by well-documented case studies
 - NASA case studies
 - Challenger
 - Post-Columbia Return to Flight
 - STS-115 Launch Stand Down Decision



Class of 2017





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