



28th Annual **INCOSSE**
international symposium

Washington, DC, USA
July 7 - 12, 2018

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Utilization of Goal Function Trees for Robust Requirements Definition

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Robust systems

- Robust systems are characterized as “systems that have acceptable behavior over a larger class of situations than was anticipated by their designers”¹
- Traditional requirements often fail to consider conditional and scenario requirements due lack of knowledge of how to organize the requirements²




System requirements are frequently inconsistent with or inadequate for system utilization.



Failure Cases DART

- Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) was an autonomous satellite that had a mission of meeting up with another satellite but instead collided³




System lacking off nominal state for a creditable off nominal event.





Failure Case MCO

- Mars Climate Orbiter failed upon entering Mars' orbit with a trajectory of 170 kilometers below the planned insertion point⁴

Failure to prepare and understand the off nominal state.




Fault Trees



- Bell Laboratories created this method to study the Minuteman 1 Launch Control System⁵
- Hierarchical decomposition method of determining points of failure
- Resource straining task to cover all possible points of failure

GFT Origins

- Derived complications from defining abort conditions for the Ares I⁶
- Fault Trees, Event Sequence Diagrams, and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis entered a classification process to generate the Abort Condition List⁶
- Monitored Vs. Non-monitored condition⁶



New methodology required to capture downstream system events.




- [illegible]


Engineers must understand the transition to the off nominal state and actions in such state.




Model Based System Engineering



Structure



Behavior



Requirements

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P bandwidth : Bandwidth {B...	A5 : Bandwidth@19d96093
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P engine Thrust : Engine Th...	A2 : Engine ThrustT@623508e8
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P engine ThrustC : Engine T...	: Engine ThrustC@76852891
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P fuel to Air Ratio : Fuel to ...	A1 : Fuel to Air Ratio@17141592
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P link Margin : Link MarginC...	A3 : Link MarginCommand@3fc7080a
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> V CableLosses : Real	27.0000
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> V FreeSpaceLoss : Real	130.0000
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> V LinkMarginValue : Real	14.6000
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> V ReceiverGain : Real	18.0000
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> V ReceiverSensitivity : R...	88.3000
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> V TransmitterGain : Real	28.3000
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> V TransmitterPower : Real	37.0000
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P link MarginRecieve : Link ...	Link MarginRecieve@31568de9

Simulation



GFT Illustration

Mission :

- UAV semiautonomous flight

Goal:


- Take off from point A and fly to point B back to point A

Secondary Goals:

- Successful data exchange between ground and UAV
- Maintain propulsion from UAV's engine
- Navigational Functionality
- Electrical Power Functionality



Use Case Diagram



System operation
during mission phase.



Off Nominal Functions


- Off Nominal Recoverable
 - Activate management of subsystem with the new goal of mitigating off nominal event
- Off Nominal Mission Abort
 - Non common mission critical components goes off nominal causing new goals of aborting the mission and returning to base.
- Off Nominal Termination
 - Flight computer or operator triggers the new goal of a forced crash in an ideal location on the way back to base

**Off Nominal Recoverable
Link**
entry / Off Nominal Link Margin


**Off Nominal
Mission Abort**
entry / Mission Abort

**Off Nominal
Termination**
entry / Flight Termination


Goal Diagram



Functions Diagram




Link Traceability






Nominal Link Function




Nominal Link




Calculation of link value.



Off Nominal Recoverable Link




Off Nominal Recoverable Link






Off Nominal Mission Abort



Off Nominal Mission Abort


Termination Criteria

- Connectivity
- Environment
- Location






Off Nominal Flight Termination





Off Nominal Flight Termination





System Development⁸





Figure 1. Context diagram for the FAR approach in IDEF0.


System Development Flow Down



Top Level UAV Goals




Requirements Flowdown






Goals to System Requirements






Future Work

- Lynx X-ray Observatory
- Identify nominal and off nominal “day in the life” operations
- Identify the types of requirements the GFT promotes



Capture system behaviors to satisfy existing requirements and identification of new requirements.





Conclusion

- MBSE instrumental in the identification system behaviors
- Application of GFT methodology to identify goals of the system
- Allocation of goals to requirements to identify missing and off nominal requirements

: Constraint(s) {[LinkMarginValue > 10](#)} owned by [Link MarginCommand](#) failed.
: Requirement [Maintain Connectivity](#) is not satisfied.
: Constraint(s) {[Thrust > 29300](#)} owned by [Engine ThrustT](#) failed.
: Requirement [Provide Engine Thrust](#) is not satisfied.
: Constraint(s) {[Bandwidth == true](#)} owned by [Bandwidth](#) failed.
: Requirement [Maintain Connectivity](#) is not satisfied.
: Constraint(s) {[LinkMarginValue > 10](#)} owned by [Link MarginRecieve](#) failed.
: Requirement [Maintain Connectivity](#) is not satisfied.





References

- [1] Sussman, Gerald Jay. "Building robust systems an essay." Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2007).
- [2] Sage, Andrew. Systems Engineering: Analysis, Design, and Development. Wiley, 2016.
- [3] Thomas, Dale. Selected systems engineering process deficiencies and their consequences. ACTA Astronautica, 2007.
- [4] Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board Phase I Report. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1999.
- [5] Larsen, Waldemar F. *Fault Tree Analysis*. p. 80.
- [6] Pisanich Greg, Bajwa Anupa, Sanderfer Dwight. The Ares I Abort Failure Detection, Notification, and Response System: An Overview of the Development Process. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2007.
- [7] Johnson, Stephen B. Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management. AIAA, 2013.
- [8] Eriksson, Magnus, et al. "7.2.2 Performing Functional Analysis/Allocation and Requirements Flowdown Using Use Case Realizations - An Empirical Evaluation." *INCOSE International Symposium*, vol. 16, no. 1, July 2006, pp. 965–79.



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