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Geoffrey Biggs, Tier IV, Inc.

Andrius Armonas, No Magic / Dassault Systemes

OMG standard for integrating safety and reliability analysis into MBSE: Concepts and applications



Outline

- Motivation and history
- Current status of the specification for integrating safety and reliability analysis into MBSE
 - The structure of the specification
 - Methods covered
- Core concepts, implementation principles
- Demonstration of model-based FMEA
- Future plans



Terms and definitions

- Reliability
 - Ability of a functional unit to perform a required function under given conditions for a given time interval
- Safety
 - Freedom from unacceptable risk

ISO/IEC 2382:2015 Information Technology

IEC 61508:2010 EEPE safety-related systems



Terms and definitions


- The objective of functional safety is freedom from unacceptable risk of:
 - physical injury or
 - damage to the health of people either directly or indirectly (through damage to property or to the environment)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functional_safety



Safety Standards

- Each industry has developed domain specific ISO standards, derived from IEC 61508 that reflect more accurately the needs and challenges within their domain.







Why do model-based Safety and Reliability?

- Current methods have been in use for decades.
- They seem to work...


The problem with the traditional approach




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
The problem with the traditional approach



The problem with the traditional approach




The problem with the traditional approach






Benefits of a model-based approach






Benefits of a model-based approach





Benefits of a model-based approach



OMG Safety and Reliability profile working group



- RFP published by OMG in March, 2017
- Initial version submitted to OMG on Aug 28, 2017
- Current status: revising the specification (until Aug 2019)
- Main contributors of content:
 - Japan's National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
 - NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory
 - France's Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA)
 - No Magic, Inc. / Dassault Systemes
 - Ford Motor Company
 - GfSE e.V. (the German chapter for systems engineering, Gesellschaft für Systems Engineering)
 - The Aerospace Corporation
- Plus comments from many others



Standards-based


- Based on established international standards as much as possible
- Reliability: IEC 60812 for FMEA and IEC 61025 for FTA
- Safety: IEC 61508 and its offspring
 - Medical software safety: IEC 62304
 - Medical equipment safety: ISO 14971
 - Automotive safety: ISO 26262
 - Other fields welcome, of course!



The library & profile



Profile and library structure






Supported Methods

FMEA




- FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) is a bottom-up (or can be performed functionally for top-down) methodology designed:
 - to identify potential failure modes for a product, part or process,
 - to assess the risk associated with those failure modes,
 - to rank the issues in terms of importance, and
 - to identify and carry out corrective actions to address the most serious concerns.



IEC 61025

FTA

- FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) is a top-down methodology designed:
 - to identify the contributing events to an undesired event across a whole system,
 - to identify how those events combine to enable the undesired event, and
 - to identify the most likely combinations of contributing events for design of preventative actions.




IEC 60812

STPA




- STPA (Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis) is a systems and controls theory based exploratory methodology designed:
 - to identify system losses to avoid and the contributing hazards
 - to identify control actions which could lead to a hazard and their causes
 - to identify constraints (requirements) on the system to prevent or mitigate hazards
 - can be applied to cyber-physical systems




GSN

- GSN (Goal Structured Notation) is a argumentation notation:
 - used to graphically present the proof that that a goal is fulfilled
 - can be used to argue a system's safety case.



ISO 26262

- ISO 26262 (Functional Safety) is a automotive specific functional safety standard:
 - Provides an automotive safety lifecycle
 - Defines a risk-based approach to determine Automotive Safety Integrity Levels






Key concepts

- A core foundation on which to build model-based S&R tools
- Representative profiles for specific domains and methodologies
- Easy to extend to additional domains and methodologies
 - In particular, without needing a long standardization cycle

Core Concepts






Implementation Approach


- UML Structure-description mechanisms are used
 - Block Definition Diagram/Internal Block Diagram (aka Class diagrams, Composite Structure diagrams for non-SysML people)
- Effort to reduce the usage of Profiling mechanisms (Stereotypes, Tags) in favor of using more Model Library Approach
- Seems to “rhyme” well with the SysML v2 group efforts!

SysML/UMML-to-S&R mapping






FMEA example: system model







FMEA example: requirements violation



FMEA example: identification of situations



FMEA example: chaining and rating situations






FMEA example: tabular view


| # | Name | Item | Failure Mode | Local Effect Of Failure | Final Effect Of Failure | SEV | Cause Of Failure | OCC | Prevention Control | Detection Control | DET | OxD | RPN | Recomm |
|---|------|--------------------|--------------------------------|---|-------------------------|-----|---|-----|--|--|-----|------|------|--|
| 1 | F1 | airbag : Airbag | Bag does not open on impact | | Injure Passenger | 4.0 | Sensor is not functioning properly Broken wire Controller is not functioning properly | 4.0 | Designed per material standard MS-XX123 | Environmental stress test 03-000 | 4.0 | 16.0 | 64.0 | Add redundancy monitor impact Light to not |
| 2 | F2 | light : Light | Light does not turn on | Car inoperable at night Car inoperable under battery | | 3.0 | Battery dead | 2.0 | | | 3.0 | 6.0 | 18.0 | |
| 3 | F3 | light : Light | Light does not turn on | Car inoperable at night Car inoperable under battery | | 3.0 | Broken wire | 2.0 | | | 3.0 | 6.0 | 18.0 | |
| 4 | F4 | light : Light | Light does not turn off | Car won't start | | 3.0 | Short circuit in switch | 2.0 | | | 3.0 | 6.0 | 18.0 | Redesign: indicator with driver's door while lights |
| 5 | F5 | light : Light | Light does not turn on | Car inoperable at night Car inoperable under battery | | 3.0 | Headlight out | 2.0 | | | 1.0 | 2.0 | 6.0 | Redesign: lights-on display in console; |
| 6 | F6 | light : Light | Light does not turn off | Car won't start | | 2.0 | Operator error (left on) | 2.0 | | | 2.0 | 4.0 | 8.0 | Redesign: indicator with driver's door while lights visual lights |
| 7 | F7 | light : Light | Light does not turn on | Car inoperable at night Car inoperable under battery | | 2.0 | Switch broken | 2.0 | | | 1.0 | 2.0 | 4.0 | |
| 8 | F8 | light : Light | Light does not turn on | Car inoperable at night Car inoperable under battery | | 2.0 | Switch corroded | 2.0 | Designed per material standard MS-XXX1 | | 3.0 | 6.0 | 12.0 | |




FMEA example: FMEA pattern




FMEA example: FMEA pattern parametrics



FMEA example: applying FMEA analysis pattern




FMEA example: RPN calculation






FMEA example: mitigation




FMEA example: tying situations to states and parts





FTA integrated with FMEA: example





Let's keep in touch!

Geoffrey Biggs <gbiggs@ieee.org>

Andrius Armonas

<andrius.armonas@3ds.com>



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