



**31<sup>st</sup>** Annual **INCOSE**  
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# Using Security Views in UAF



# Presenters

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# Agenda



The  
importance  
of security

The UAF  
architecture  
framework  
and the grid

Why Add  
Security?

A UAF  
security  
model  
example

Conclusions



## Cyber-security

- 67% of financial institutions reported an increase in cyber-attacks in the past year.
- Ransomware attacks worldwide rose 350% in 2018.
- Ransomware attacks are estimated to cost \$6 trillion annually by 2021.
- 50% of 582 surveyed security professionals do not believe that their organization is prepared to repel a ransomware attack.

## MBSE is

- the formalized application of modeling to support system requirements, design, analysis, verification and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout development and later life cycle phases (INCOSE 2007).
- MBSE must deal with security issues in general including cyber-security.
- Security handling is a cross-cutting concern that affects the system definition in its entirety.



- Looking at the architecture of an enterprise in a grid was originally defined by Zachmann.
- The importance of aspects such as What needs to be done, How and Why and When were used in his grid but has an even older use.

I KEEP six honest serving-men  
 (They taught me all I knew);  
 Their names are What and Why and  
 When  
 And How and Where and Who.  
 I send them over land and sea,  
 I send them east and west;  
 But after they have worked for me,  
 I give them all a rest.

The Elephant's Child  
 Rudyard Kipling




## Standard means of expression – model kinds

		Taxonomy	Structure & Connectivity	Behavior	Information	Parameters	Constraints	Roadmap	Traceability
Different Domains	Strategic	Understand enterprise context			Data in all forms of Systems and re organizations	defining and deployment		As-Is To-Be  Planning  Continuous Availability	Traceability across all levels
	Operational	Understand the Software				Operational/ Logical Flow			
	Services	Identify Services				Actual behavior and capabilities			
	Personnel & Resources	Understand constituent people							
	Security					Security Analysis			
	Projects	Understand development				development milestones			
	Standards					compliance			
		Requirements							

	Taxonomy Tx	Structure Sr	Connectivity Cn	Processes Pr	States St	Interaction Scenarios Is	Information If	Parameters Pm	Constraints Ct	Roadmap Rm	Traceability Tr
Metadata Md	Metadata Taxonomy Md-Tx	Architecture Viewpoints <sup>a</sup> Md-Sr	Metadata Connectivity Md-Cn	Metadata Processes <sup>a</sup> Md-Pr	-	-	Conceptual Data Model,	Environment Pm-En	Metadata Constraints <sup>a</sup> Md-Ct		Metadata Traceability Md-Tr
Strategic St	Strategic Taxonomy St-Tx	Strategic Structure St-Sr	Strategic Connectivity St-Cn	-	Strategic States St-St	-			Strategic Constraints St-Ct	Strategic Deployment, St-Rm Statgic Phasing St-Rm	Strategic Traceability St-Tr
Operational Op	Operational Taxonomy Op-Tx	Operational Structure Op-Sr	Operational Connectivity Op-Cn	Operational Processes Op-Pr	Operational States Op-St	Operational Interaction Scenarios Op-Is			Operational Constraints Op-Ct	-	-
Services Sv	Service Taxonomy Sv-Tx	Service Structure Sv-Sr	Service Connectivity Sv-Cn	Service Processes Sv-Pr	Service States Sv-St	Service Interaction Scenarios Sv-Is			Service Constraints Sv-Ct	Service Roadmap Sv-Rm	Service Traceability Sv-Tr
Personnel Pr	Personnel Taxonomy Pr-Tx	Personnel Structure Pr-Sr	Personnel Connectivity Pr-Cn	Personnel Processes Pr-Pr	Personnel States Pr-St	Personnel Interaction Scenarios Pr-Is	Logical Data Model,	Measurements Pm-Me	Competence, Drivers, Performance Pr-Ct	Personnel Availability, Personnel Evolution, Personnel Forecast Pr-Rm	Personnel Traceability Pr-Tr
Resources Rs	Resource Taxonomy Rs-Tx	Resource Structure Rs-Sr	Resource Connectivity Rs-Cn	Resource Processes Rs-Pr	Resource States Rs-St	Resource Interaction Scenarios Rs-Is	Physical schema, real world results		Resource Constraints Rs-Ct	Resource evolution, Resource forecast Rs-Rm	Resource Traceability Rs-Tr
Security Sc	Security Taxonomy Sc-Tx	Security Structure Sc-Sr	Security Connectivity Sc-Cn	Security Processes Sc-Pr	-	-			Security Constraints Sc-Ct	-	-
Projects Pj	Project Taxonomy Pj-Tx	Project Structure Pj-Sr	Project Connectivity Pj-Cn	-	-	-			-	Project Roadmap Pj-Rm	Project Traceability Pj-Tr
Standards Sd	Standard Taxonomy Sd-Tx	Standards Structure Sd-Sr	-	-	-	-			-	Standards Roadmap Sr-Rm	Standards Traceability Sr-Tr
Actuals Resources Ar		Actual Resources Structure, Ar-Sr	Actual Resources Connectivity, Ar-Cn	Simulation <sup>b</sup>					Parametric Execution/Evaluation <sup>b</sup>	-	-
Dictionary * Dc											
Summary & Overview SmOv											
Requirements Rq											



# Agenda





# Why Add Security Views?



- The need for security is ubiquitous
  - People, infrastructure, electrical and electronics systems, networks, cyber, physical, social, etc.

Security is a system aspect, not a component

- Embedded, cross cutting, integrated

Security spans the lifecycle

- system concept inception to implementation, updates, maintenance, and disposal

Not currently in DoDAF

- The UAF views are based on the Canadian DNDAF with a number of additions





## Stakeholders:

- Security Architects, Security Engineers. Systems Engineers, Operational Architects.

## Concerns:


- Addresses the security constraints and information assurance attributes that exist on exchanges between resources and Operational Performers

## Definition:


- Definition: illustrates the security assets, security constraints, security controls, families, risks, mitigations, interactions, processes, and measures required to address specific security concerns.




## Security views in UAF




# Security Taxonomy Example






# Agenda




## An example



- A model example that deals with security is used in this presentation (Search and rescue) and the integration in UAF views of security elements with operational elements and resource elements are demonstrated.
- Operational issues also needs to be dealt with from a security aspect and risks can be associated with an operational description.





# Resulting Resource Risk Handling





## Security Taxonomy


Defines the assets across security domains and their locations. Includes hardware, software, systems, operational.


## Security Measurements


Actual security classifications that will be used in the model.




- Shows structure of security systems and information and where it is used











# Security Process (Sc-Pr)












Legend		Resources Taxonomy															Security Taxonomy [Security]										
Protects		Aircraft Control Subsystem	C2 System	Civilian Boat	Communications	Communications Controller	Distress Monitor Artifact	Distress Signal	Distress Signal Sensor	EMS Dispatch System	Monitor Unit	Radio Equipment	Rescue Craft	Safety Device	Tasking Order	Telemetry Data	Telemetry System	Victim Medical Data	Cell Phone Network	Civilian	Communication Redundancy	Cyber Defence	SAR Field Organization	SAR HQ	Sec-Enclave-2	Sec-Enclave-3	
Security Taxonomy			7			1				6		1			5	5	1	5		1				1	1		
ESC1 Two Step Authentication	2		↗							↗																	
SC3 AC-1 Access Control policy and procedures	1		↗																								
SC4 AC-2 Account Management	2									↗								↗									
SC5 AU-3 Content of Audit Records	3		↗												↗	↗											
SC6 AU-5 Response to Audit Processing Failures	3		↗							↗						↗											
SC7 AU-6 Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting	2														↗			↗									
SC8 IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizat	4		↗												↗	↗		↗									
SC9 IA-4 Identifier Management																											
SC10 IA-5 Authenticator Management	5		↗							↗					↗	↗		↗									
SC11 AC-3 Backup Communications	3					↗				↗		↗							3	↗				↗	↗		
SC12 EC-1 Encryption of Communicated Data	3		↗							↗							↗										
SC13 EC-2 Encryption of Stored Data	3														↗	↗	↗										




Resources Structure [ Systems Communication Description ]











Working Together to Build Confidence

# Risks Analysis

**Djenana Campara**

*Chief Executive Officer*


*Member, Object Management Group Board of Directors*

*Chair, System Assurance Task Force*

# Ecosystem Foundation: Common Fact Model



## Data Fusion & Semantic Integration




Tools integration possible only through standards





# Agenda








- The UAF defines enterprise architectures
  - At various levels of abstraction
  - From multiple viewpoints
- The UAF implements DoDAF, NAF and MODAF in SysML
  - Traces to systems engineering
  - Provides multiple forms of trade-off analysis
- Security Views have been integrated into the UAF
- This will enable system security to be modeled and dealt with as part of the enterprise architecture.
- Cross-cutting concerns can be handled in the model without complicating a specific model.



# Questions and Answers





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