

Towards a Software Defined Truck

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Introduction

- Heavy vehicles are the lifeblood of logistics operations
 - Equipped with electronic controls, embedded networking, remote monitoring and diagnostic
- Cyber-security concerns have been raised lately
- SAE-J3061 recommends concurrent testing and verification for cyber-security analysis [8]
 - Trucks are expensive with challenging logistics
 - Not all parts are readily available



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Tech

Fiat Chrysler recalls 1.4 million cars after Jeep hack

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


Needs Analysis

- A scalable, cost-effective approach to testing cybersecurity posture of heavy vehicles.
- Use actual heavy vehicle electronic control units (ECUs)
 - Incorporate actual logic
 - Accommodate testing of proprietary software
- Remote access for a distributed workforce.
- Reconfigurable systems



Software Defined Truck



Programmable trucks in the cloud for the people, by the people



Contribution

- A novel idea
 - The concept of Software defined network (SDN) exists
 - Previous proposals on car-specific testbeds [3, 4] do not address reconfigurability
 - A handful of proposals [1,2] to extend SDN for automotive systems
 - Lack of structured requirement engineering
 - Reprogrammable networks only
 - Require modification of the target ECUs
 - Do not consider security implications like information leakage and intentional destruction of testbed components
 - An amalgamation of technologies, some existing and others created in-house
- This preliminary report presents
 - A mix of the conceptual and practical underpinnings of designing, implementing, and maintaining a software defined truck through its lifecycle
- A generalization is the software-defined vehicle but the focus here is on heavy
 - The concepts of SDT can be used/extended by other embedded testbed providers
 - Can be used for other research purposes aside cyber-security



Organization

1. Background on Heavy Truck Electronics
2. Target Users and Use Cases
3. High-level Requirements and Challenges
4. (Preliminary) Design Details
5. Future work




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Embedded Electronics




- A congregation of
 - Mechanics
 - Analog transducers used to sense and manipulate mechanical parameters
 - Electronic control units (ECU) that
 - Receive analog input from sensors
 - Process corresponding digital data
 - Send analog output through actuators
- Communication with external servers
 - Diagnostic and management
 - Predominantly chosen remote vector



Embedded Communication

- ECUs communicate with each other over physical wiring using sequence of bits
- A set of ECUs communicating with each other forms a network
 - Typically obeys communication specifications from the Controller Area Network (CAN) 2.0 standards
 - CAN is a **low-latency** serial communication protocol
 - SAE-J1939 specify high-level networking constructs including message formats
 - Messages are carried by CAN
 - Messages are made of the forms <ID><Data>
- Networks can be interconnected using bridges or gateways




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Use case 1,2 of 4

- **Use case: Provision**
 - **Actor:** Anybody with the possession of a fitting device or network or even a truck, typically hardware vendors, garage personnel, university research groups etc.
 - **Discussion:** May make some features unavailable if required
- **Use case: Configure**
 - **Actor:** Anybody, typically researchers, tutors, students, hackers etc.
 - **Discussion:** No physical manipulation, remote only




“For the people, by the people”: Unlike most proposals, does not rely on a single point delivery instead this is **crowdsourced**



Use case 3,4 of 4

- **Use case:** Simulate
 - **Actor:** Anybody, typically researchers, tutors, students, hackers etc.
 - **Discussion:** Best-case replacement for physically unavailable components; e.g. transducers, driver, driving environment etc.
- **Use case:** Experiment, observe
 - **Actor:** Anybody, typically researchers, tutors, students, hackers etc.
 - **Discussion:** Targets can be (configured) real-world hardware or simulations




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High-level Requirements for the Software Defined Truck

1. Facilitating real-world testing on a remotely accessible testbench
2. Being able to crowdsource
3. Being able to reconfigure and simulate truck system components
4. Facilitate application development



1. Facilitating real-world testing on a remotely accessible testbench


- **Functional challenge:**

Private local area networks (LANs) are not reachable from the outside.

- Embedded systems are configured to access the Internet through private IP addresses and Network Address Translation (NAT)
- Amazon web-services (AWS) provides a framework for embedded device connectivity and management, but...
 - Not automotive specific
 - Is not open-sourced

- **Resource Access Control challenge:**

Exclusive access to devices being actively used in experiments to ensure experiments do not interfere with each other [5]





2. Make crowdsourced systems publicly accessible

- **Functional challenges:**

- Crowdsourcing requires a homogenous set of steps to set up and maintain participation
- Testbench components need to interoperate and communicate with the SDT framework

- **Security challenges:**

- Unintended use of system reserved for private usage
- Information leakage; e.g. intellectual property, identifying information [5]
- Intentional damage to system [3,5]
- Pivoting external attacks [5]
- Identity spoofing
 - Can be used to bypass all other security controls



3. Being able to reconfigure and simulate truck system components

- **Functional challenge:**

Digital components on the truck can be reconfigured by altering contained data but data items are not readily accessible

- Requires complicated procedures such as finding debug ports, manual soldering and reflashing [6]

- **Availability challenge:**



May become dysfunctional or “bricked” in the process thus increasing cost of maintenance

- ECU firmware is intellectual property of the device manufacturer

- **Quality assurance challenge:**

Achieving a level of acceptable fidelity of the testbed [5]

- The testbench must resemble a real-world MHD vehicle system.
- Latency between the user’s application and the physical testbench must be minimal
- Simulating some components may will degrade fidelity
 - Virtualized networks will bear non-zero latency overhead




4. Facilitate application development


- **Functional challenges**

Related to software engineering and lifecycle management

- Provision of application programming interfaces
- Provision of pre-defined classes
- Provision of extendable templates



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


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


The Software Defined Truck Ecosystem




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 2. User interface (UI)
 2. SDT Virtualization support
 1. SDT Hardware
 2. SDK Plugins
 2. SDT Workflow
 5. Future work




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
Overview

Extended to reduce latency





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



Overview

- Designer GUI
 - User's gateway to SDT's backend controller
 - Query and provision systems
- Rendering GUI
 - Vehicle simulator
 - The CARLA (Dosovitskiy et al., 2017) simulation engine is used.
 - CARLA provides a Python application programming interface (API) and enables simulating the driving environment aside the actual vehicle. This can be especially critical for automated driving related research on an SDT.
 - Data visualization interface is provided to observe high-level abstractions from network data




Description of the Designer GUI



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
Overview

- Hardware counterparts of the software abstractions from the SDK.
- Because SDT follows a crowdsourced model the exact model of hardware cannot be ascertained beforehand.
 - Need the hardware SDK to be installed
 - We describe the preliminary in-house testbench model.
 - The model follows SYSPML semantics i.e. blocks and connections with multiplicities.




Description


Ubuntu 20.04
controller that
runs on 4 core
non-SMT Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU E5-
2407 0 @
2.20GHz
processor.



An Instance At The Laboratory




Description (Network programmers)




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
Description

- Extend abstract classes (named in italics) from the SDK
 - Abstracts away complexities of interacting with the hardware
 - Converts different hardware interfaces into SDT standard API
 - Ensures interoperability between hardware developed by different organizations
 - E.g., the smart sensor simulator GUI extends the *TransducerSimulator* class
- Plugins for
 1. SDT devices
 - Hardware developers can contribute by providing software level abstractions for their devices
 - SDT Team is creating some standardized APIs
 2. Protocol parsers
 - Abstract away the low-level details of network data processing
 3. Communication drivers
- Interact with physical hardware using standard networking technology



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


Activity Diagram

Public identity providers or affiliated emails

Example ID mask:
FF02<transmitter-address>
Corresponding data mask:
00000000FFFF

Techniques similar to online gaming



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- Further analysis and evaluation of the proposed models
 - Advancing our in-house testbench model
- Building remote API bridges between OEM provided programming tools and the hardware SDK.
- Investigating the usability of available approaches to address functional requirements like
 - Facilitating NAT traversal if required
 - Usability of the RT(S)P protocols to create overlays on CAN networks



References

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QUESTIONS PLEASE?

