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CANLay – A Network Virtualized Testbed for Vehicle Systems – Improving Systems Integration and Verification Efforts

Digital Engineering

- Innovative, integrated digital approach to system design.
- Utilizes authoritative sources of system data and models for lifecycle activities.
- Digital Engineering is being adopted industry wide, especially in cyber-physical system design.
 - Department of Defense has a Digital Engineering Strategy directing its use in complex system design.




DE Challenges in Horizontally Integrated Industries

- Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) may lack access to the complete technology stack.
 - Hinders comprehensive digital engineering.
 - As such, digital engineering approach must incorporate embedded hardware to represent the unavailable intellectual property.
- Hybrid method enables scalable, approach to testing at a systems level.




Brief Overview of: Electronic Control Units (ECUs)

- TLDR: They are the computers that control the vehicle.
- ECUs are embedded systems controlling electrical systems or subsystems in a vehicle.
- Essential for functions like engine management, transmission control, braking, and more.
- Increase vehicle efficiency, safety, and comfort.
- Contain proprietary information.




Brief Overview of: Controller Area Network

- Vehicle bus standard allowing inter-device communication
- Operates at OSI model's data link layer.
- Multi-master serial bus for networking Electronic Control Units (ECUs).
- Provides error detection, fault confinement, data consistency.
- Widely used in automotive and industrial applications.




Brief Overview of: J1939

- High-level communications protocol for heavy-duty vehicles and industrial equipment.
- Operates on top of CAN, facilitates communication between ECUs.
- Defines messages for diagnostic, control, etc.
- Promotes standardization and interoperability in the industry.
- Defines standards that operate at the OSI layers 1, 4, 5, and 7.



Introduction to CANLay

- CANLay: A network-based testbed enabling virtual configurations of real Electronic Control Units (ECUs)
- Allows early implementation testing and verification.
- Tests system configurations virtually, reducing the need for specific hardware test benches.
- Employs IP frames encapsulating traditional CAN frames.
- Test system can be established once and reconfigured for many systems architectures.




Current and Prior Efforts

1/2

- Commercial Solutions \$\$\$
 - Cloud-based test beds
 - Fast
 - Flexible
 - Scalable
 - Requires access to source code
 - Isolated – may not represent complete system
- Hardware-in-the-loop test beds
 - Flexible
 - High fidelity
 - Limited range


Hardware-in-the-Loop Test Beds



Current and Prior Efforts


2/2

- Manually building test beds
 - High fidelity
 - Low cost
 - Not flexible
 - Time consuming
- SocketCAN over Ethernet: Cannelloni, etc.
 - Lacks reconfigurable networks
 - Lacks support for auxiliary signals (event-driven testing)
- Software Defined Network for CAN
 - Built for in-vehicle networking




Software Defined Truck (SDT)

- Conceptual framework for CAN-based security testing in heavy vehicles.
- Globally accessible network of connected ECUs:
 - Encourages collaboration.
 - Provides expensive resources to limited-funding research projects.
- Remotely accessible, on demand reconfigurable CAN networks.




SSSF


- Smart Sensor Simulator and Forwarder
- Derivative of the Smart Sensor and Simulator devices.
 - Simulates sensor inputs to an ECU.
 - Interfaces with the CANLay network.
 - Compatible with Arduino Integrated Development Environment.
 - More information about the Smart Sensor Simulators and its evolution can be found here:
<https://github.com/SystemsCyber/SSS3>



Design of CANLay

- Client: User Interface
- CANLay API: network management.
- Smart Sensor Simulator and Forwarder: Gateway for ECUs, forwards sensor signals and CAN data.
- Server: Brokering, device management, and API handling.
- Vehicle Simulator: Provides realistic signals for event driven testing.
- Physical Devices: ECUs for data exchange and testing.






Implementation of CANLay 1/3

- CANLay Setup Process:
 - SSSFs connect and send ECU info to Server.
 - Controller registers and requests available ECUs.
 - Server checks registration and availability, assigns endpoint.
 - Connection data is sent to Controller and SSSFs.
 - Endpoints synchronize time, allocate data structures, and start forwarding messages.
- Launch simulator if applicable.

Implementation of CANLay 2/3


- CANLay CAN Exchange Process:
- Smart Sensor Simulator and Forwarders:
 - Exchange CAN messages between the Pub/Sub network and its attached ECU(s)
 - Update statistics upon receiving and sending CANLay messages.
- Controller (not shown):
 - Exchanges CAN messages between the user and the Pub/Sub network.
 - Update statistics upon receiving and sending CANLay messages.

SSSF: Smart Sensor Simulator and Forwarder



Implementation of CANLay 3/3

- CANLay Signal Exchange Process:
 - Controller forwards sensor signals to pub/sub endpoint.
 - SSSFs receive and forward sensor frames. (if applicable)
 - Controller resends sensor messages until acknowledged or max retransmissions.
- Network health monitoring tracks latency, jitter, packet loss, and goodput (application throughput).



CANLay's API


- Controller application interfaces with CANLay using a set of APIs.
- Key API features include:
 - Device registration and setup.
 - Retrieving and selecting devices.
 - Sending sensor signals to pub/sub endpoint.
 - Monitoring network health.
 - Controlling message (re)transmission.
 - Managing network connections and synchronization.
 - Accessing transport and network health data structures.



AI generated to fill page based on prompt: API

CANLay's TUI

- CANLay's TUI (Text User Interface) provides a bare-bones interface for interacting with the CANLay API.
- Key features of the TUI include:
 - Device discovery and selection.
 - Session setup and configuration.
 - Sending sensor signals and CAN messages.
 - Viewing network statistics and reports.
 - Managing experiment sessions and connections.



The screenshot shows the CANLay TUI interface. The terminal window displays the following text:

```
o
INFO: listening to server 192.168.1.8:2000
Connecting ...
Registering ...
-
Available ECUs

```



| ID | Type | Make | Model | S/N | Year |
|-----|-----------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------|
| 824 | Engine Control Module | Catapillar | 162758403 | 162758403 | 2000 |
| 360 | Engine Control Module | Paccar | 2037394 | 2037394 | 2000 |
| 728 | Engine Control Module | Cummins | CM3250A | 4235972 | 2000 |
| 720 | Brake Control Module | Bendix | K059641 | K059641 | 2000 |

Enter the numbers corresponding to the ECUs you would like to use (comma separated):
Devices successfully allocated.
Session established.
CAN frame sent.

At the bottom of the terminal window, there is a command line prompt: `> cansend 0ceeff29#0000000000000000`. The right side of the interface shows a sidebar with "CANLay Statistics" and "CAN Messages" sections.


CANLay's Health Monitoring

- Real-time health monitoring for the CANLay network.
 - Tracks packet loss, latency, jitter, and goodput.
 - Calculates network health metrics automatically.
 - Displays network health reports and statistics.
- Using shared networks presents issues when network conditions are poor.
- Displaying network health keeps user informed of network conditions.



Example Usage

- Vulnerability: Address claim attack on J1939 protocol. (Murvay and Groza, 2018)
- Targets: J1939 Electronic Control Module
- Setup: Shared gigabit local area network.
- Procedure: Select devices, start session, send malicious message.
- Result: Caterpillar ECM stopped broadcasting on to the network.
- Time: Testing completed in just a **few minutes**.




Summary and Conclusions

- Rapid Testing: CANLay significantly reduces testing time.
- Seamless Integration: CANLay integrates with CARLA and ECUs.
- Real-time Monitoring: Network health metrics enable proactive decisions.
- Vulnerability Detection: Identified vulnerable ECUs in the experiment.
- Scalability: CANLay can be used with multiple devices and networks.
- Picture shown displays logs from experiment.

| | | | | | | |
|------|-----------|--------------|-------------|------------------------|------|---------------|
| 8561 | 32.265044 | 192.168.1.27 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.51.500750) | can1 | 18FEBF0B#0000 |
| 8562 | 32.277448 | 192.168.1.3 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.510271) | can1 | 08FE6E0B#0000 |
| 8563 | 32.280078 | 192.168.1.27 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.517058) | can1 | 0CF00400#F094 |
| 8564 | 32.283279 | 192.168.1.22 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.530273) | can1 | 08FE6E0B#0000 |
| 8565 | 32.295024 | 192.168.1.27 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.532011) | can1 | 0CF00400#F094 |
| 8566 | 32.295766 | 192.168.1.27 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.546971) | can1 | 0CF00400#F094 |
| 8567 | 32.296594 | 192.168.1.22 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.547661) | can1 | 0CF00300#DF85 |
| 8568 | 32.297331 | 192.168.1.3 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.550278) | can1 | 08FE6E0B#0000 |
| 8569 | 32.297894 | 192.168.1.3 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.550824) | can1 | 18F0010B#CCFF |
| 8570 | 32.298632 | 192.168.1.3 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.551469) | can1 | 18FEBF0B#0000 |
| 8571 | 32.305990 | 192.168.1.45 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.558953) | can1 | 18EEFF00#0000 |
| 8572 | 32.312620 | 192.168.1.22 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.570450) | can1 | 08FE6E0B#0000 |
| 8573 | 32.317357 | 192.168.1.3 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.570984) | can1 | 18EEFFFE#0102 |
| 8574 | 32.319010 | 192.168.1.27 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.590289) | can1 | 08FE6E0B#0000 |
| 8575 | 32.328574 | 192.168.1.22 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.592073) | can1 | 18F0000F#C07D |
| 8576 | 32.337386 | 192.168.1.3 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.610247) | can1 | 08FE6E0B#0000 |
| 8577 | 32.340030 | 192.168.1.27 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.630442) | can1 | 08FE6E0B#0000 |
| 8578 | 32.344648 | 192.168.1.22 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.650245) | can1 | 08FE6E0B#0000 |
| 8579 | 32.357496 | 192.168.1.3 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.650777) | can1 | 18F0010B#CCFF |
| 8580 | 32.364103 | 192.168.1.22 | 239.255.0.0 | (1670920491.651323) | can1 | 18FEBF0B#0000 |
| 8581 | 32.376888 | 192.168.1.22 | 239.255.0.0 | | | |

Future Work

- SocketCAN compatibility. Acts as abstract network layer for existing security engineering tools such as SavvyCAN and Metasploit.
- Precision Time Protocol (PTP): Switching to PTP for sub-millisecond accurate synchronization. (Done!)
- API Integration: Enabling faster, automated testing and compatibility with vulnerability scanners. (Done!)
- Explore efficient and secure wide area networking capabilities.





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