




**International Council on Systems Engineering**  
*A better world through a systems approach*

# Digital Safety Analysis for Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs)

Ron Claghorn, Idaho National Laboratory (USA)

Peter Suyderhoud, Idaho National Laboratory (USA)



# There's never been a better time to be an engineer

## Before Digital Tools

The System Engineering perspective is based on systems thinking. Systems thinking is a unique perspective on reality—a perspective that sharpens our awareness of wholes and how the parts within those wholes interrelate. When a system is considered as a combination of system elements, systems thinking acknowledges the primacy of the whole (system) and the primacy of the relation of the interrelationships of the system elements to the whole. Systems thinking occurs through discovery, learning, diagnosis, and dialog that lead to sensing, modeling, and talking about the real-world to better understand, define, and work with systems. A systems thinker knows how systems fit into the larger context of day-to-day life, how they behave, and how to manage them. [INCOSE]

## Now

A Systems Engineer is a generalist:


- Develops and maintains the system concept start to finish.
- Coordinates the work of engineering disciplines.
- Steps in when a technical resource such as 3D modeling is missing.

# Today's Agenda

- INL's Digital Transformation Mission (Peter)
- What is a Small Modular Reactor (SMR)?
- The typical licensing process
- Human Systems Integration (HSI) to make a better license application
- An elegant system
  - Design verification & system validation
  - Traversable structure
  - Dynamic views
  - Automatic Configuration Management
  - Transformation to Probability Risk Assessment (PRA)



# Idaho National Laboratory

- Innovation for a secure and resilient clean energy future
- INL's five strategic science & technology initiatives work together to advance our mission.
- The nation's nuclear energy laboratory




# Digital Transformation at Idaho National Laboratory

- WHY? Nuclear power has a historical cost overrun of 120% with poor schedule performance
- Vogtle Units 3 & 4
- Initial \$14B, final > \$30B (+\$17B)
- Initial 2026, final 2024 (+8 yrs)
- DE technologies and techniques demonstrated in other industries (defense, aerospace, etc.) have historically shown the ability to save around 15-20% on project cost & schedule based on statistics from DoD and commercial construction
- **DE is a risk reduction capability for nuclear, enabling projects to complete closer to budget and schedule than current trends**




# Digital Transformation Process



# Digital Ecosystems



- **Interconnected** software data exchange used to enable digital engineering and digital twinning systems
- **Connects** data to other digital definitions created later in the development process
- Maintains system **integrity** across lifecycle
- Standardized ontologies to store and relate information
- Suite of software adapters using open-source directed acyclic graph (DAGs) technology





# Digital Twins

- Digital Twins represent the merging of integrated and connected data, sensors and instrumentation, artificial intelligence, and online monitoring into a single cohesive unit.
- What is different than a traditional simulation?
- Integration of real-time data
- Dynamic model update (AI/ML integration)
- Real-time operator visualization
- Accurate predictions with fused (integrated) data
- Ability to enable autonomous control
- Distributed across computing platforms






# Extended Reality (XR)

- A graph and source of information is nice, but humans are visual – we need a better way to consume data
- Extended reality (XR)
  - Virtual reality (VR)
  - Augmented reality (AR)
  - Mixed reality (MR)
- Centering information on models facilitates understanding
- Engineers can interact with visualization – inspect, change, delete, etc.




# Some INL Case Studies


## Seismic Analysis Automation



## NRIC Digital Engineering Ecosystem




## AGN-201 University Reactor Digital Twin



# Artificial Intelligence

Engineering and systems have become more complicated – AI can help us manage this complexity by accelerating / augmenting traditional systems engineering processes



# Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)





**LARGE, CONVENTIONAL REACTOR**  
700+ MW(e)



**SMALL MODULAR REACTOR**  
Up to 300 MW(e)



**MICROREACTOR**  
Up to ~10 MW(e)




# Advantages of SMRs/Microreactors

Much smaller and simpler than traditional nuclear power reactors.

- Minimum site preparation
- Standard, commercial components
- Flexible operation
- Enhanced safety
- Refueling (every 2-10 years)
- Operational lifetime: 5 –20 years.



# SMR Lifecycle





# Mass Production

According to Copenhagen Atomics, thorium molten salt breeder reactors can be mass manufactured on assembly lines with an expected output of minimum 1 reactor per day (per assembly line).

<https://www.copenhagenatomics.com/about/>




Image generated by Microsoft Designer

# Modular Deployment




<https://www.copenhagenatomics.com>: Conceptual visualization of a 1GW power plant.

- 578 in Virginia, USA ([www.datacentermap.com](http://www.datacentermap.com))
- Use as much as 100 MWe (US DOE 2020)



## Numerous SMR Developers



Source: The NEA Small Modular Reactor Dashboard (2023). The list changes rather rapidly.



# Traditional Licensing Processes

The IAEA identifies a multi-step process and 32 examples of documents to be submitted to the regulatory body. The regulatory body must review the documentation to assess the safety of the proposed nuclear installation.

*Source: IAEA SSG-12, Licensing Process for Nuclear Installations.*

The licensing process usually takes years of submittals and feedback. *Source:*


<https://www.nuclearinnovationalliance.org>



Image generated by Microsoft Designer

# International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) SSG-12

## Licensing Process for Nuclear Installations



“alternative approaches do exist, especially for countries with experience in nuclear power where several similar nuclear installations have already been built and are proven.”

# Proposal for an Alternative Licensing Process

Design an application review process that is repeatable, objective, and comprehensive.

## Case Study: Digital Documented Safety Analysis (DgDSA)

The Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) is a US Department of Energy (USDOE) that requires the review and approval of numerous documents. It includes an in-depth description of hazards, safe boundaries, and hazard controls.




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# Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Motivation

**Multiple Test Beds Hosting Multiple Microreactors  
Each Requiring a Documented Safety Analysis**

**DOME Test Bed**



**DOME: Demonstration of Operational  
Microreactor Experiments**


**LOTUS Test Bed**



**LOTUS: Laboratory for Operation and  
Testing in the United States**

**See INL/RPT-23-72206, Recommendations to Improve NRC Licensing**

# Study human performance to make a better license application



# Bad practices that diminish human performance

Based on a review of recent (but highly redacted) submittals to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)\* and author reviews of developer documents

\*<https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/who-were-working-with/pre-application-activities.html>

- Use of non-standard abbreviations and terms
- Unnecessary words
- Paragraphs with multiple topics
- Misidentified performers
- Unnecessary complexity
- Incomplete

# Non-standard abbreviations and terms

INCOSE *Guide for Writing Requirements (GWR)* is also applicable to technical writing

## Characteristics and Rules in the GWR

**C11 – Consistent:** Use a consistent language (that is, the same words are used throughout the set to mean the same thing).

**R37 – Acronyms:** Consistent with other artifacts developed across the lifecycle.

**Confusing:** “Ice cream scoop” (for a pump outlet)

**Example Standards:** [NRC Glossary](#) for reactors and [OmniClass®](#) for host facilities.



**Solution:** Load database with standard terms and abbreviations and use macros to flag non-standard items.

# Unnecessary words


Refer to best practices from software code, database structures, and construction specifications

## Examples:

- A passive voice adds auxiliary (helper) words.
- Duplicate words such as “The System shall” when the entire section is about the System.
- Duplicate requirements among various documents

## Solution:

- **Active Voice:** Start directives with a verb
- **Generalize:** Sort information into a hierarchy and present in a tree view.
- **Inherit:** Don't copy general information into containers of specific information.



# Paragraphs with multiple topics

The INCOSE *Guide for Writing Requirements* (GWR) is also applicable to technical writing.

Common English Syntax is also applicable to technical writing. For example, *Topic Sentences That Make the Purpose Clear*


<https://www.yourdictionary.com/articles/topic-sentences-purpose>

## Characteristics and Rules in the GWR

**C5 – Singular:** (A paragraph) should state a single capability, characteristic, constraint, or quality factor.

**R1 – Structured Statements:** Conform to a standard pattern (such as paragraphs that begin with a topic sentence).

**Solution:** Parse paragraphs into single topics and paste two or three words at the beginning of each paragraph to identify the topic.




# Misidentified performer

Most codes and standards direct a human to perform something.

Yet, many functions, requirements, and descriptions written by engineers misidentify the system as the performer.

**Incorrect:** “The system shall comply with ASME B31.3.”

**Solution:** Use case diagrams and associated tables clarify who or what is the performer: specifiers, designers, contractors, crafts, software, hardware, etc.






# Unnecessary Complexity

**Problem:** Focusing on codes and standards rather than functions

**Result:** Amorphous, incomplete set of requirements.

**Solution:** Focus on functions first. What must the system do? Then for each function, identify the performance requirements.



# An elegant solution

A simplification of  
NASA/TP-20205003644



**Author's Definition:** A data-based application that is so well structured that it only takes simple queries to derive an enormous amount of useful information.

# Design Verification & System Validation

ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288  
as cited in the INCOSE  
Systems Engineering  
Handbook

**Design Verification** is comparing design outputs to design requirements to verify compliance.


**System Validation** is the objective evidence that the system, when in use, fulfils its business or mission objectives and stakeholder requirements, achieving its intended use in its intended operational environment



# Traversable Structure

## Verify

- Decomposition
- Every component has a function
- Every function has performance requirements
- Every requirement has objective evidence of compliance



# Dynamic Views

## Part Hierarchy

The screenshot shows the 'Parts Tree' window with a list of parts on the left and a 'Parts List' table on the right. A filter dialog is open, allowing users to filter parts by size, system description, and product series.

**Parts List Table:**

SIZE	SYSTEM DESI	P&ID LINE ID	PRODUCT SE	MATERIAL	MAT
14"			TILATION S GS	AL	
14"			TILATION S SST	A31	
20"			TILATION S SST	A3	
20"			TILATION S CS	A67	
20"			TILATION S SST	A3	
14"			TILATION S SST		
1/2"			PORT	SST	
14"			TILATION S GS		
16"			TILATION E SST		
16"			TILATION E SST		
16"			TILATION E SST		
1/2"			PORT	SST	
16"			TILATION E SST		
20"			TILATION E SST		
20"			TILATION E CS		
20"			TILATION E SST		
16"			TILATION E SST		
16"			TILATION E SST		
16"	CVS	223	VENTILATION E SST		
16"	CVS	224	VENTILATION E SST		
16"	CVS	225	VENTILATION E SST		
12"	CVS	226	VENTILATION E SST		
11"			VENTILATION E SST		

**Filter Dialog:**

- Sort A to Z
- Sort Z to A
- Clear filter from SIZE
- Text Filters:
  - (Select All)
  - (Blanks)
  - 1/2"
  - 11"
  - 12"
  - 14"
  - 16"
  - 20"

## Parts in Each System

The screenshot shows the 'Parts Tree' window with a list of parts on the left and a 'Parts List' table on the right. The table shows the parts in each system, including equipment ID, description, manufacturer, model, and arrangement.

**Parts List Table:**


EQUIP ID	DESCRIPTION	MANUFACTU	MODEL	ARRANGE
CVS-EF-001	BACKWARD-CU NEW YORK BLO SIZE 24			8
CVS-EF-002	BACKWARD-CU NEW YORK BLO SIZE 24			8

**Parts Tree:**

- All Parts
  - Parts with System Abbreviations in Equipment IDs
    - Containment Building (CB)
    - Containment Isolation System (CIS)
    - Containment Ventilation System (CVS)
      - BLOWER SCHEDULE
      - CVS AIR OPERATED VALVE SCHEDULE
      - CVS AIR OPERATOR SCHEDULE
      - CVS SAFETY CLASS HAND VALVE SCHEDULE
      - DAMPER SCHEDULE
      - DIFFUSER SCHEDULE
      - DUCTWORKPIPING BELLOW SCHEDULE
      - ELECTRIC HEATER SCHEDULE
      - GRILLE SCHEDULE
      - HEPA FILTER HOUSING SCHEDULE
      - INSTRUMENT LIST
      - MAKE-UP AIR UNIT SCHEDULE
      - PIPEWORK SCHEDULE
  - Control Room Area (CRA)
    - Demineralized Water System (DWS)
    - DOME Security System (DSS)
    - Environmental Monitoring System (EMS)
    - Facility Yard (YARD)
    - Fire Protection System (FPS)


# Configuration Management

Making sure that the design basis, the design, the physical system, and the operating procedures are always consistent.




# Phase 2 – Transformation of Data

## Model-Based Systems Engineering



## Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)



Risk Analysis and Assessment Modeling Language (RAAML)





# 35<sup>th</sup> Annual **INCOSE** international symposium

hybrid event

**Ottawa, Canada**  
July 26 - 31, 2025

### Access hatch

An airtight door system that preserves the pressure integrity of reactor, while allowing access to personnel and equipment.

## Activation

The process of making a **radioisotope** by bombarding a stable

### Active fuel length

The end-to-end dimension of fuel material within a fuel assembly element").

### Activity

The rate of disintegration (transformation) or decay of radioactive activity (also known as radioactivity) are the curie (Ci) and the Becquerel (Bq).

## MasterFormat®

		28 16 00	interfaces	08 70 79	hardware
	<b>abatement</b>	28 11 00	global applications	10 28 26	hygiene and custom
02 82 13	asbestos	28 14 15	inputs and outputs	12 40 00	interior decorating
02 80 00	hazardous materials	28 15 11	integrated credential readers	12 92 43	interior landscaping
01 66 13	hazardous materials, procedures	28 15 11	keypads	11 53 43	laboratory
02 63 00	hazardous materials, site	28 19 11	loading dock systems	10 28 23	laundry
02 83 00	lead	28 18 11	metal detectors	04 05 23	masonry
02 84 00	PCB	28 17 17	mobile access identification management systems	12 41 00	office
01 42 13	abbreviations			32 94 00	planting
	<b>aboveground storage tanks</b>	28 13 11	mobile applications	09 65 13	resilient flooring
33 56 43	aviation fuel storage	28 14 11	network controllers	07 72 00	roof
33 56 13	fuel, utility	28 13 11	operating systems	13 11 46	swimming pool
23 13 23	fuel-oil, facility	28 19 13	parking garages	12 42 00	table
33 56 13	hydrocarbon	11 14 00	pedestrian traffic	10 28 13	toilet
23 13 26	liquefied-petroleum gas, facility	28 19 15	perimeter power sources	08 35 13	<b>accordion folding</b>
09 96 13	abrasion-resistant coatings	28 05 07	printers and encoders	08 35 16	doors
	<b>abrasive aggregates</b>	28 14 17	remote devices	10 22 39	grilles
03 05 00	concrete	28 15 19	self check-in and kiosk visitor systems	40 17 13	panel partitions
09 60 00	flooring	28 17 13	sniffing equipment	40 17 16	acetylene welding piping
32 10 00	paving	28 18 17	software		acetylene-hydrogen welding piping
09 66 00	terrazzo flooring	28 13 11	system requirements	03 35 00	<b>acid etching</b>
40 32 10	abrasive materials piping and chutes	28 12 01	surge protection	08 81 00	concrete
05 55 00	abrasive metal treads and nosings	28 05 09	system hardware	12 17 13	glass
		28 14 00	vehicle identification systems		glass artwork
09 60 00	abrasive safety floors	28 19 00	wireless key fobs	04 61 00	<b>acid-resistant</b>
09 30 00	abrasive tile	28 17 11	x-ray equipment	09 96 35	brick
23 64 13	absorption water chillers	28 15 13	<b>access doors</b>	09 62 35	coatings
26 32 00	AC generators	28 18 13	ductwork	08 81 00	flooring
40 77 13	acceleration measurement	08 31 13	roof hatches	04 05 13	gloss mortar
03 05 00	accelerators, concrete	23 33 33	access flooring		<b>acoustic</b>
00 65 19	acceptance certificate	07 72 33	access hatches, roof	02 22 16	assessment
01 71 16	acceptance of conditions	09 69 00	access panels	00 31 19	available information
01 64 00	acceptance of products	07 72 33		09 83 16	ceiling coating
01 23 00	acceptance procedures for material handling	08 31 13		09 83 22	draperies
				09 83 00	finishes
				09 62 18	floors

## Parse paragraphs into single topics

### Before

The reactor core is enclosed within a canister filled with an inert gas just above atmospheric pressure to protect reactor components from oxidation while enhancing heat transfer. The core design consists of graphite blocks with repeated, segmented, hexagonal unit cells oriented horizontally along the length of the core. The unit cells contain channels for fuel, burnable absorbers, alkali metal heat pipes, and shutdown rods.

### After

**Reactor Enclosure:** A canister filled with an inert gas encloses the reactor core. The system maintains the gas above atmospheric pressure to protect reactor components from oxidation while enhancing heat transfer.


**Core Configuration:** The core consists of graphite blocks with repeated, segmented, hexagonal unit cells oriented horizontally along the length of the core.

**Unit Cell Content:** Unit cells contain channels for fuel, burnable absorbers, alkali metal heat pipes, and shutdown rods.

# Human Factors Engineering (HFE)

An understanding of human limitations that lead to errors and omissions.


- Distractions
- Inexperience
- Confusing terms
- Fatigue





- Visualize the complicated
- Link objects to identify interfaces

- Visualize the complicated
- Link objects to identify interfaces




# Generalization and Inheritance

Generalization is the process of identifying common parameters at each layer of a hierarchy so that a model can take advantage of the simplifying benefit of inheritance.

The top level of this hierarchy is an 'abstract' object that identifies parameters that are placeholders for real data in child objects. In essence, it is a table with column headings but no rows under the headings.

Parameters in parent objects, both abstract and real, must be inherited in child objects.


Child objects realize some abstract parameters and may add new abstract parameters.





# Decomposition

Decomposition is the process of breaking up a complicated system into smaller subsystems so that engineers and analysts focus their efforts on one part at a time.




# Performers identified in ASME B31.3

Each performer has:

- Preconditions
- Prompt to act
- Action/Function
- Success criteria
- Extensions when something goes wrong

uc Install Qualified Piping



# Operational experience at INL

- Over 75 years of experience operating more than 50 reactors (and counting)
- Management of more than 200,000 assets and growing rapidly
- Reliability analysis of assets to underpin probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs)

**Find Problematic Equipment**


Fiscal Year: 2018 2027

**Equipment Corrective Maintenance Tasks**

FACILITY	Avg Days to CM	Task Count	% Task Count	Avg Cost per Task	Total Task Cost	% Total Task Cost
MFC	662	15789	100.0%	\$1,287	\$20,786,648	100%
MF785 - HOT FUEL EXAMINATION FACILITY	611	2510	15.9%	\$1,682	\$5,395,199	26%
MFC	617	2458	15.6%	\$1,706	\$5,387,829	26%
Structural	404	474	3.0%	\$1,320	\$596,541	3%
785 NUCLEAR OPERATIONS INTERIOR MISCELLANEOUS WORK	13	403	2.6%	\$1,114	\$448,928	2%
NOM-785-WORK	13	403	2.6%	\$1,114	\$448,928	2%
PERSONNEL DOORS	217	18	0.1%	\$841	\$15,145	0%
PERS-DOORS	217	18	0.1%	\$841	\$15,145	0%
FIRE DOORS (BARRIERS)	51	13	0.1%	\$455	\$5,919	0%
785-FIRE-DOORS	51	13	0.1%	\$455	\$5,919	0%
TRANSFER TUNNEL HYDRAULIC SYS #1	68	8	0.1%	\$11,268	\$90,147	0%
EEOPS-PWSY-8506	68	8	0.1%	\$11,268	\$90,147	0%
TOP HATCH AND CASK TUNNEL HATCH DOORS	375	6	0.0%	\$3,478	\$20,870	0%
CASK-HATCH-DORS	375	6	0.0%	\$3,478	\$20,870	0%
DOOR (DECON)	311	3	0.0%	\$55	\$164	0%
SLT-DOOR-101	311	3	0.0%	\$55	\$164	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>662</b>	<b>15789</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>\$1,287</b>	<b>\$20,786,648</b>	<b>100%</b>

INL Idaho National Laboratory

# 10,000 References to Codes and Standards



# Simplify Specifications (Functions First)

1

**Before:** 20 pages of codes and standards related to an analog temperature transmitter.



3

**After:** Two pages identifying a **function**, performance, and a functional test



2

**Concept of Operations:**  
Distributed digital control



# Design Verification

## Requirement Verification and Traceability Matrix

Idaho National Laboratory

NRIC DOME Test Bed Containment Building & Isolation System (SDD-586) Verification Matrix	Identifier: RVTM-MS Revision: 001 Effective Date: DRAFT	Page: 18 of 86
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Parent ID	Child ID	Requirement Name	Requirement Text	Rationale	Verification Method	Verification Criteria	Verifying Person	Verification Status	Verification Summary	Objective Evidence
				permanent platforms. Note this includes FSC valves inside and outside of containment.					valves are located within 7 ft of the operating floor, with (6) of the eight within 4 ft. of the operating floor. [16130]	
[16062]	[Parent]	CB: Passive Penetration Leak Rate	Each Passive Penetration shall maintain a leak rate of less than 50 cc/sec.	At 50 cc/sec per passive penetration, the cumulative leakage from each penetration, personnel door and equipment hatch are tracked to ensure that the total containment leakage rate remains below the limit of 10% of containment volume per day (24 cfm).	Inspection	Identify leak tests in the appropriate specifications.	Mauro Oliveira [INL]	Compliant	[21478] CB: Passive Penetration Leak Rate: Each passive penetration is leak tested by the manufacturer after fabrication (re. SPC-3206) and following installation (ref. SOW-19419). The welded connections are visually inspected to provide assurance that the welded connections have insignificant leakage. Additionally, the penetration is tested following alteration or modification. [16062]	[132995] NRIC DOME Test Bed NQA-1 Equipment Procurements
[16063]	[Parent]	CB: Personnel Door Leak Rate	The personnel door shall maintain a leak rate of less than 100 cc/sec.	Containment allowable leak rate is 10%V (24 cfm). The personnel door needs to maintain a leak rate within the total budget.	Inspection	Inspect Construction Spec	Mauro Oliveira [INL]	Compliant	[21479] CB: Personnel Door Leak Rate: The personnel door is leak tested by the manufacturer after fabrication (re. SPC-3207) and following installation (ref. SOW-19419). The welded connections are visually inspected to provide assurance that the welded connections have insignificant leakage. Additionally, the personnel door seals are tested using an operating instruction prior to establishing containment for reactor operation to verify it is less than 100 cc/sec.	[132996] Test Bed Commercial Equipment Procurements

# System Validation

